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(UN)COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES: 
SEARCHING FOR A WORKABLE EXTENSION OF FREE 
SPEECH RIGHTS TO CICS 
Mark J. Pesce 
“No sign of any kind except a small nameplate on a lamppost or affixed 
to the front of a house shall be displayed to the public view on any lot. . . .  No 
sign of any type may be displayed from the window of any home.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Governing documents of condominiums, cooperatives, and 
homeowners associations (“HOAs”)2 around the United States are 
replete with restrictive covenants like the one above.  These common 
interest communities (“CICs”) are created to provide owners or 
tenants with quiet, manicured, and aesthetically pleasing 
environments;3 hence the frequent imposition of outright bans on 
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University of Notre Dame.  I would like to thank my family, friends, and Rebecca Salk 
for their love and support in law school and while writing this Comment.  I would also 
like to thank my advisor Professor Angela C. Carmella, as well as Judge Robert Contillo, 
Professor Paula A. Franzese, Ronald L. Perl, and Michael S. Karpoff for their helpful 
perspectives.  Finally, a special thanks to my father, who surely never would have 
suggested this topic had he known how much I would bother him about it. 
 1  First Amended and Restated Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions, FALMOUTH 
AIRPARK, available at http://falmouthairpark.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/ 
Covenants.doc (last visited May 14, 2015). 
 2  Each of these kinds of developments is included under the umbrella term 
“common interest communities,” but exhibit markedly different characteristics.  For a 
survey of the differences, see Paula A. Franzese & Steven Siegel, The Twin Rivers Case: 
Of Homeowners Associations, Free Speech Rights and Privatized Mini-Governments, 5 RUTGERS 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 729, 730 n.3 (2008).  In general though, “[c]ommon-interest 
communities are those in which the property is burdened by servitudes requiring 
property owners to contribute to maintenance of commonly held property or to pay 
dues or assessments to an owners association that provides services or facilities to the 
community.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES ch. 6, intro. note (2000). 
 3  A Florida state appellate court cogently described this purpose, remarking that: 
[I]nherent in the condominium concept is the principle that to promote 
the health, happiness, and peace of mind of the majority of the unit 
owners since they are living in such close proximity and using facilities 
in common, each unit owner must give up a certain degree of freedom 
of choice which he might otherwise enjoy in separate, privately owned 
property.  Condominium unit owners comprise a little democratic sub 
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things such as pets,4 satellite dishes,5 and political signs and activity.6 
For better or worse, the number of Americans living in CICs has 
grown tremendously in the last few decades, and CICs now occupy a 
significant percentage of home ownership in the United States.7  For 
many, the increase in prevalence of CICs has created attendant 
confusion with the extent to which communities can restrict individual 
rights.8  In response, courts and legislatures have slowly given more free 
speech rights to residents of CICs.9  For others though, this recent 
trend towards individual rights has come at the expense of the 
collective interest.10  This inescapable clash between expressional 
 
society of necessity more restrictive as it pertains to use of condominium 
property than may be existent outside the condominium organization. 
Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 181–82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1975); see also Gerald Korngold, Resolving the Flaws of Residential Servitudes and Owners 
Associations: For Reformation not Termination, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 513, 513 (1990) 
(“Residential developers often impose servitude schemes on tract and high-rise 
developments to increase the desirability of the housing units.”); 2012 Public Policies of 
Community Associations Institute, Aesthetics as an Economic Issue, at 9, 
http://www.caionline.org/govt/policies/Documents/public%20policies-
April%202012%20update.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2014) (“When aesthetics of any one 
development look clean, well maintained, properly proportioned and part of an 
overall design or compatible color scheme, owner expectations are met and property 
values are sustained and improved.”). 
 4  Mark S. Dennison, Enforcement of Restrictive Covenant or Lease Provision Limiting 
the Keeping of Animals or Pets on Residential Property, 93 AM. JUR. TRIALS 193 (2004). 
 5  Alois Valerian Gross, Annotation, Radio or Television Aerials, Antennas, Towers, 
or Satellite Dishes or Discs as Within Terms of Covenant Restricting Use, Erection, or 
Maintenance of Such Structures Upon Residential Property, 76 A.L.R.4th 498 (1989). 
 6  Monique C.M. Leahy, Annotation, Homeowners’ Association Defense: Free Speech, 93 
AM. JUR. TRIALS 293, at § 7 (2004). 
 7  Statistical Review 2013, FOUND. FOR CMTY. ASS’N RES., at 3, 
http://www.cairf.org/research/factbook/2013_statistical_review.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2014) (noting that CICs now represent a staggering twenty-four percent of 
U.S. homes); see also National Statistics on U.S. Community Associations, CMTY. ASS’N INST., 
http://www.caionline.org/info/research/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 10, 
2015) (illustrating that CICs now house almost sixty-six million Americans). 
 8  See, e.g., Edward R. Hannaman, State and Municipal Perspectives - Homeowners 
Associations, presented to Rutgers University Center for Government Services 
Conference, at 3 (Mar. 19, 2002) (“It is obvious from the complaints [to DCA] that 
that [home]owners did not realize the extent association rules could govern their 
lives.”); Susan F. French, The Constitution of A Private Residential Government Should 
Include A Bill of Rights, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 349 (1992) (“Dreams of 
homeownership can turn sour for people whose building or landscaping plans are not 
approved and for people who learn too late that they will not be permitted to put up 
political signs, for sale signs, or holiday decorations.”). 
 9  See infra Part IV.  
 10  2012 Public Policies of Community Associations Institute, supra note 3, at 9 (noting 
that attempts to interfere with “community-crafted aesthetic controls” undermines the 
“lifestyle expectations of the collective ownership”). 
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versus property and contractual rights11 has led to a host of suggested 
and implemented solutions,12 but no more clarity in this realm.13  Such 
an inconsistency of treatment thwarts the goals of predictability and 
deterrence from litigation,14 and it is clear that there is a need for a 
workable method of extending more free speech rights to CICs.15 
Although this area of the law has seen a significant number of 
illuminating publications,16 this Comment adds to the discussion in two 
ways.  First, although a variety of proposals have been offered for 
extending free speech rights to CICs over the past two decades,17 
 
 11  The Restatement acknowledges the tension between the two competing 
interests, saying that 
The law of residential common-interest communities reflects these 
tensions between protecting freedom of contract, protecting private and 
public interests in security of the home both as a personal base and as a 
financial asset, and protecting the public interest in the ongoing 
financial stability of common-interest communities.  It also reflects the 
tensions between protecting the democratic process at work in common-
interest communities and protecting the interests of individual 
community members from imposition by those who control the 
association. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES ch. 6, intro. note (2000). 
 12  See infra Part IV.  
 13  See, e.g., Peter Applebome, My House, My Rules. Or So One Might Think, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 29, 2007, at A25 (“This is not an entirely new world, but it’s still a vexing 
one, where the rules are still being sorted out . . . .”). 
 14  See Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass’n, 29 P.3d 797, 808 
(Cal. 2001) (quoting Todd F. Simon, Independent but Inadequate: State Constitutions and 
Protection of Freedom of Expression, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 305, 318 (1985)) (“The notion that 
free expression can, and potentially does, mean something slightly different in each 
state even when provisions read identically is not fully supportable.”). 
 15  See infra Part III (discussing why CICs should not be “speech free” zones). 
 16  See, e.g., Lisa J. Chadderdon, No Political Speech Allowed: Common Interest 
Developments, Homeowners Associations, and Restrictions on Free Speech, 21 J. LAND USE & 
ENVTL. L. 233 (2006); Paula A. Franzese, Privatization and Its Discontents: Common Interest 
Communities and the Rise of Government for “The Nice”, 37 URB. LAW. 335 (2005); Franzese 
& Siegel, supra note 2; Aaron R. Gott, Ticky Tacky Little Governments? A More Faithful 
Approach to Community Associations Under the State Action Doctrine, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
201 (2012); David J. Kennedy, Residential Associations As State Actors: Regulating the Impact 
of Gated Communities on Nonmembers, 105 YALE L.J. 761 (1995); Evelyn C. Lombardo, A 
Better Twin Rivers: A Revised Approach to State Action by Common-Interest Communities, 57 
CATH. U. L. Rev. 1151 (2008); Adrienne Iwamoto Suarez, Covenants, Conditions, and 
Restrictions . . . On Free Speech? First Amendment Rights in Common-Interest Communities, 40 
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 739 (2006). 
 17  The major suggestions have been to: (1) treat CIC boards as “state actors” and 
thus apply state constitutional free speech protections to CICs, see infra Part IV.A; (2) 
rely on legislative action to protect free expression, see infra Part IV.B; (3) push 
homeowners to pass a residents’ bill of rights, see infra Part IV.C; (4) apply a 
constitutional test that analyzes the reasonableness of restrictive covenants (the New 
Jersey approach), see infra Part IV.D; and (5) strike down covenants that are found to 
be against public policy (the Restatement approach), see infra Part V. 
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further analysis of each of these theories is needed in light of some 
important recent developments around the United States.18  Second, 
few if any commentators have scrutinized the practical implications of 
each of the major proposals to extend free speech to CICs, as most 
have been largely theoretical.  In reality, the application of some of 
these theories could make, and in some instances already have made,19 
the treatment of free speech in CICs even more confusing and 
inconsistent.  Therefore, the merits and disadvantages of each theory 
must be analyzed to determine which actually presents the best 
opportunity to extend reasonable free speech rights to CICs around 
the country.20 
In Part II, this Comment describes how the “state action” 
requirement has insulated CICs from constitutional scrutiny.  In Part 
III, this Comment explains why CICs should not create “speech free” 
zones, but should instead reasonably embrace the uncommon interests 
of its residents.  Part IV presents the prevailing theories for application 
of free speech principles to CICs, analyzes their efficacy, and explains 
why each is not an ideal solution to the problem.  In Part V, this 
Comment argues that state courts should adopt the policy of judicial 
non-enforcement of servitudes that violate public policy, in line with 
the Restatement (Third) of Servitudes.  In Part VI, this Comment 
suggests that no matter which solution courts adopt around the 
country, boards should proactively amend their governing documents 
to better reflect reasonable restrictions on expressional freedoms. 
II.  STATE ACTION: WHY THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. 
 
 18  There are several important recent developments.  First, one state has further 
developed its unique adoption of a major theory.  See infra Part IV.D (discussing New 
Jersey’s extension and clarification of its unique constitutional test in Dublirer v. 2000 
Linwood Ave. Owners, Inc., 220 N.J. 71 (2014)).  In addition, another state has extended 
free speech rights into a more conservative region of the country, utilizing a 
constitutional test never before used outside of the state that created it.  See infra note 
169 and accompanying text (discussing a Missouri state court’s adoption of New 
Jersey’s constitutional test in Lamprecht v. Tiara at the Abbey Homeowners Association, No. 
12-JE CC0027, 2013 WL 6144144 (Mo. Cir. Oct. 3, 2013)).  And finally, two other states 
have recently revived a major theory and applied it to CICs for the first time.  See infra 
note 42 (discussing Shelley v. Kraemer’s application in Bd. of Managers of Old Colony Vill. 
Condo. v. Preu, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 728, 732 (2011), review denied, 964 N.E.2d 985 (Mass. 
2012) and Lamprecht, 2013 WL 6144144). 
 19  See, e.g., Franzese & Siegel, supra note 2, at 742 (“The Twin Rivers decision is not 
a model of clarity.”); Golden Gateway Ctr., 29 P.3d at 801 (citation omitted) (“Robins was 
less than clear ‘as to the scope of the free speech rights it was recognizing.’”). 
 20  See infra Part IV (describing and assessing the viability of each of the major 
proposed theories). 
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CONSTITUTION DOES NOT APPLY TO CICS 
Over the last few decades, and with increasing frequency, 
residents have challenged the regulations in their communities.21  
These residents have argued, inter alia, that their constitutional rights 
of free speech and association are infringed under the United States 
Constitution and state constitutions.  Until recently, these suits have 
been relatively fruitless, with residents having little success in 
subjecting CICs to First Amendment protections.  This failure can be 
largely attributed to the “state action” requirement under the federal 
and state constitutions, which establishes that violations of 
constitutional rights are redressable only if committed by 
governmental entities.22 
A. U.S. Constitution 
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; 
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances.”23  Flowing naturally from this 
language is that the Constitution prohibits only government 
interference with constitutional rights, not actions by private entities.24 
There has only been one instance in which the U.S. Supreme 
Court has addressed residential restrictions on political expression 
under the First Amendment.  In City of Ladue v. Gilleo,25 the Supreme 
 
 21  For example, in New Jersey alone there has been a clear uptick in the number 
of cases the New Jersey Supreme Court has addressed on this issue in recent years.  See 
State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535 (1980); N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. 
Realty Corp., 138 N.J. 326 (1994); Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers 
Homeowners’ Ass’n, 192 N.J. 344, 367 (2007); Mazdabrook Commons Homeowners’ 
Ass’n v. Khan, 210 N.J. 482, (2012); Dublirer, 220 N.J. 71 (2014). 
 22  The genesis of the state action doctrine was in the Civil Rights Cases, where the 
Supreme Court held that “until some State law has been passed, or some State action 
through its officers or agents has been taken, . . . no legislation of the United States 
under said amendment, nor any proceeding under such legislation, can be called into 
activity, for the prohibitions of the amendment are against State laws and acts done 
under State authority.”  Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883). 
 23  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 24  Despite this logical conclusion, the state action doctrine has remained in flux 
since its inception, and is still considered a “conceptual disaster area.”  Charles L. 
Black, Jr., Foreword: State Action, Equal Protection, and California’s Proposition 14, 81 
HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967); see also State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123 
HARV. L. REV. 1248, 1250 (2010) (“In the years following [the Civil Rights Cases], the 
Court transformed the state action doctrine into one of the most complex and 
discordant doctrines in American jurisprudence.”). 
 25  512 U.S. 43 (1994). 
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Court analyzed sign restrictions imposed by a municipality in a 
Missouri town.26  After a resident posted a sign protesting the war, the 
resident was notified that these signs were prohibited in the city.27  
After denying the resident a variance, the city passed an ordinance with 
a blanket prohibition on signs.28  The Supreme Court ruled that while 
a “time, place and manner” restriction was permissible, a ban on an 
entire unique medium of expression was an overreach of the state’s 
police power, and therefore unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment.29 
Despite City of Ladue’s promising ruling, it is of limited 
applicability in the context of private community associations.  In City 
of Ladue, the state action requirement was clearly met, because the sign 
restrictions had been created and enforced by a municipality.30  To the 
contrary, because the boards of CICs are not government entities, their 
actions are insulated from the restrictions imposed by the First 
Amendment, and thus are not subject to the same constitutional 
protections as the Supreme Court extended in City of Ladue.31 
There have been several other important Supreme Court cases 
that have hinted at possible alternate methods of enforcement of First 
Amendment rights against private entities.  The seminal case is Marsh 
v. Alabama,32 which held that the actions of a private company town 
were constrained by constitutional protections because the town 
functioned as a governmental entity.33  Initially, the Court extended 
this holding, applying the same reasoning to other private entities like 
shopping centers;34 but this holding has since been rolled back,35 and 
 
 26  Id. at 43. 
 27  Id. at 45. 
 28  Id. at 46. 
 29  Id. at 56. 
 30  The Court explained that although municipalities could regulate signs under 
their police power, these forms of expression were still protected under the Free 
Speech Clause, and thus the municipality’s powers were not unlimited.  Id. at 48. 
 31  But see infra Part IV.A (discussing the argument, advanced by several scholars, 
that HOAs should be treated as state actors because modern CICs perform many of 
the functions of local governments). 
 32  326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
 33  Id. at 508 (“[T]he town of Chickasaw does not function differently from any 
other town.”). 
 34  Amalgamated Food Emp. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 
308, 315, 318 (1968), abrogated by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (finding that 
“[t]he shopping center [at issue was] clearly the functional equivalent of the business 
district of Chickasaw involved in Marsh”). 
 35  See Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 507 (holding that property does not “lose its private 
character merely because the public is generally invited to use it for designated 
purposes,” and that “[t]he essentially private character of a store and its privately 
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the Court’s now long-standing position has been that the First 
Amendment does not apply to private actors.36  In the words of the 
Supreme Court: “It is, of course, a commonplace that the 
constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only against 
abridgment by government, federal or state. . . .  This elementary 
proposition is little more than a truism.”37  Therefore, individuals 
generally may not seek recourse for First Amendment violations by 
private entities, including homeowners associations, by claiming that 
they are “quasi-governmental” entities like the company town in 
Marsh.38 
Another method frequently cited as a possible means of applying 
state action to traditionally private actors is through the doctrine 
espoused by the Supreme Court in Shelley v. Kraemer.39  In Shelley, the 
Court noted that “the action of state courts and of judicial officers in 
their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the State within 
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.”40  Some scholars 
believed that this holding would and should be extended to other 
fundamental rights like free speech,41 but courts have generally limited 
 
owned abutting property does not change by virtue of being large or clustered with 
other stores in a modern shopping center”); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 
(1972). 
 36  See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 80–81 (1980); Hudgens, 424 
U.S. at 513.  Constitutional scholar Frank Askin has succinctly described the Court’s 
change in heart and current state action doctrine: 
[B]ecause of decisions of the United States Supreme Court that post-
date the Earl Warren era, plaintiffs in these cases can claim no rights 
under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  With the change 
in the make-up of the Court following the election of Richard Nixon as 
president in 1968, earlier decisions generally labeled as public-function 
cases were overruled either overtly or sub silentio, and private property 
recovered its legal sanctity when it came into conflict with fundamental 
individual rights. 
Frank Askin, Twin Rivers: Why the Appellate Division Got it Right, N.J. LAWYER, Oct. 2006, 
at 9. 
 37  Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 513. 
 38  See, e.g., Kalian at Poconos, LLC v. Saw Creek Estates Community Ass’n, Inc., 
275 F. Supp. 2d 578, 589 n.14, 590 (M.D. Penn 2003) (holding that the association’s 
public functions do not “deem the Association a state actor” and that “the holdings of 
Marsh and subsequent cases are [] limited”); Midlake on Big Boulder Lake, Condo. 
Ass’n v. Cappuccio, 449 Pa. Super. 124, 128 (1996) (holding that a private organization 
“cannot abridge the rights of the First Amendment of the Constitution”); Snowdon v. 
Preferred RV Resort Owners Ass’n, 379 F. App’x 636, 637 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
the association had not assumed the attributes and functions of a municipality). 
 39  334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 40  Id. at 14. 
 41  See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. d (2000) 
(describing the varying readings of Shelley by scholars and courts: (1) there is state 
action if the state takes any action to enforce even privately made covenants; (2) Shelley 
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this holding to racially restrictive covenants.42 
Thus, applying the First Amendment to private entities has not 
been fruitful, despite numerous initially promising avenues.  As a 
result, those seeking recourse for the actions of private entities have 
increasingly relied instead on the free speech protections offered by 
state constitutions. 
B. State Constitutions 
As an initial matter, state courts are generally the ultimate arbiters 
of their state’s own laws and constitution.43  Therefore, even though 
the federal government requires state action under the U.S. 
Constitution, states are free to impose their own requirements for 
seeking the protections of state constitutions.44  Moreover, state courts 
usually have more latitude in analyzing the state action requirement, 
as most state constitutions do not contain express language 
referencing state action.45 
 
is limited to racial covenants; (3) an intermediate position that holds that Shelley 
prohibits enforcement of covenants denying fundamental rights, which is one many 
state courts adopt). 
 42  See Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass’n., 29 P.3d 797, 810 
(Cal. 2001) (citing Cole, Federal and State “State Action”: The Undercritical Embrace of a 
Hypercriticized Doctrine, 24 GA. L. REV. 327, 353 (1990)) (“Although the United States 
Supreme Court has held that judicial effectuation of a racially restrictive covenant 
constitutes state action . . . it has largely limited this holding to the facts of those 
cases.”).  But see Lamprecht v. Tiara at the Abbey Homeowners Association, No. 12-JE 
CC0027, 2013 WL 6144144 (Mo. Cir. Oct. 3, 2013) (holding that judicial enforcement 
of a private covenant restricting free speech through political signage violated the 
Missouri constitution pursuant to Shelley); Bd. of Managers of Old Colony Vill. Condo. 
v. Preu, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 728, 732 (2011), review denied, 461 Mass. 1110 (2012) 
(holding that state action arose from a civil lawsuit over a covenant, where costs were 
allocated under a state statute); see also generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: 
SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. d (2000). 
 43  See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975) (“This Court . . . 
repeatedly has held that state courts are the ultimate expositors of state law.”); 
Federated Publications, Inc. v. Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d 51, 57 (1980). 
 44  The right for a state to recognize broad free speech rights on some private 
property under its own constitution was affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 
seminal Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) decision (“Pruneyard”).  
After Pruneyard, only a handful of states took the Supreme Court up on its offer, 
including the California Supreme Court on remand (“Robins”).  See Jon Golinger, 
Shopping in the Marketplace of Ideas: Why Fashion Valley Mall Means Target and Trader Joe’s 
Are the New Town Squares, 39 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 261, 268–69 (2009) (“In the wake 
of Pruneyard, high courts in five other states - Colorado, Massachusetts, New Jersey, 
Oregon and Washington - eventually followed California’s lead in interpreting their 
state constitutions to protect at least some free-speech activities in privately owned 
shopping centers.”). 
 45  Compare CALIF. CONST. art. I, § 2, pt. a (“Every person may freely speak, write 
and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of 
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Despite that, state courts have nonetheless almost always found 
state action requirements in their own constitutions.46  This language, 
from the Washington Supreme Court, is indicative of the treatment of 
missing state action language in state constitutions: 
It is a 2–foot leap across a 10–foot ditch . . . to seize upon the 
absence of a reference to the State as the actor limited by the 
state free speech provision and conclude therefrom that the 
framers of our state constitution intended to create a bold 
new right that conflicts with the fundamental premise on 
which the entire constitution is based.  To do so would not 
be to “interpret” our constitution, but to deny its very 
nature.47 
Therefore, although states sometimes discuss and adjust the 
boundaries of state action under their state constitutions,48 virtually all 
have declined to impose substantial state constitutional obligations on 
 
this right.  A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.”), with U.S. 
CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government 
for a redress of grievances.”); see also, e.g., Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 45 
N.Y.2d 152, 160 (1978) (“Conspicuously absent from the State Constitution is any 
language requiring State action before an individual may find refuge in its 
protections.”). 
 46  See Comm. For A Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners’ Ass’n, 192 N.J. 
344, 363 (2007) (“[T]he vast majority of other jurisdictions that have interpreted a 
state constitutional provision with language similar to our constitution’s free speech 
provision require ‘state action’ as a precondition to imposing constitutional 
obligations on private property owners.”).  Although this has been the case for 
decades, there is a recent, albeit limited, trend towards finding state action by private 
entities under state constitutions.  See infra Part IV. 
 47  Southcenter Joint Venture v. Nat’l Democratic Policy Comm., 113 Wash. 2d 413, 
424 (1989).  Indeed, some state courts have brutally criticized the reasoning of state 
courts that have circumvented the state action doctrine to extend free speech rights 
to residents of CICs, including California in Robins.  See, e.g., SHAD Alliance v. Smith 
Haven Mall, 66 N.Y.2d 496, 501 (1985) (citation omitted) (“[In Robins] [t]here is not 
much analysis and only tangential discussion, if it can be called that, of the State action 
question.  It is evident that the result in Robins was dictated by ‘the accident of a change 
of personalities in the Judges of [the] court,’ which this court has correctly condemned 
as ‘a shallow basis for jurisprudential evolution.’”); Jacobs v. Major, 139 Wis. 2d 492, 
514, 520 (1987) (“It is significant that the majority did not analyze the constitutional 
sections, but rather summarily stated the protections granted by those sections.  It 
appears to be more a decision of desire rather than analytical conviction. . . .  Our 
constitution defines and limits the powers of state government; it is not a license for 
the judiciary to convert what the judiciary perceives to be desirable social policies into 
constitutional law.”). 
 48  See, e.g., Sharrock, 45 N.Y.2d at 160 (“[T]he absence of any express State action 
language [in the New York constitution] simply provides a basis to apply a more 
flexible State involvement requirement than is currently being imposed by the 
Supreme Court with respect to the Federal provision.”). 
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private property owners.49 
As a result, both the federal and most state constitutions do not 
provide any protection to individuals seeking to engage in speech 
within the CICs they call their home.  This leaves protection of those 
liberty interests to private law, where individuals are left with the ability 
to either select residences that permit their desired free speech or push 
for greater protections within their existing communities.  This reality 
raises the question: do residents in private communities need 
additional free speech protections? 
III.  WHY CICS SHOULD NOT BE “SPEECH FREE” ZONES 
Covenants, conditions, and restrictions (“CC&R”) serve a 
legitimate purpose.  Developers generally put CC&Rs into place before 
selling any units in an attempt to provide uniform, aesthetically 
pleasing environments for people to live and socialize.50  CC&Rs 
enforce this relative uniformity, ensuring that no singular unit owner’s 
tastes or practices trump the values of the community.51  While some 
commentators decry the abuses of associations and board members,52 
many insiders instead paint a vivid picture of demanding, erratic, and 
difficult owners53 who force boards to be more authoritative in an effort 
 
 49  The major notable exception to this is New Jersey, which does not require state 
action as a prerequisite for extending the protections of the state constitution.  See infra 
Part IV.D. 
 50  See supra note 3. 
 51  See Evan J. Rosenthal, Letting the Sunshine In: Protecting Residential Access to Solar 
Energy in Common Interest Developments, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 995, 997 (2013) (“CC&Rs 
are aesthetic in nature, designed to ensure uniformity in appearance and protect 
property values.”); see also Declaration of Aspen Heights Protective Covenants, Conditions, 
and Restrictions, VALDE FINE HOMES LLC, http://www.valdehomes.com/pdf/ 
valde_ccrs.pdf (last visited May 16, 2015) (“In considering whether to approve 
applications, the Committee shall consider and give great weight to protection of views 
of other Owners and considerations of aesthetics and uniformity of appearance in 
Aspen Heights.”); Welcome New Residents, BENEDICT HILL ESTATES HOMEOWNERS ASS’N, 
http://benedicthillsestates.org/benedicthillsestates/page.html?pf=yes&page 
_id=30#PA1 (last visited Oct. 16, 2014) (“BHEA is a ‘planned community’ of 229 lots 
for the benefit of all members to ensure consistency, uniformity, aesthetically pleasing 
conditions and environment . . . .”). 
 52  See infra notes 63–67. 
 53  These types of actions are exhibited in Preu, where the owner engaged in a 
variety of confrontational, and even dangerous, activities that required board 
intervention (including placing bags with feces in common areas, obstructing 
common areas, and interfering with fire doors).  Bd. of Managers of Old Colony Vill. 
Condo. v. Preu, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 728, 730 (2011).  The court noted that “[t]here was 
evidence at trial of a history of erratic and disruptive behavior by Preu at the 
condominium, and of a growing strain in relations between Preu on the one hand and 
the board and condominium manager on the other.”  Id. 
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to rein them in.54  Arguably, if we begin to erode the power of CC&Rs, 
we may stand to lose some of the common in common interest 
communities. 
In addition, there are legitimate arguments made by HOAs that 
residents in these communities have waived some of their rights by 
voluntarily living in communities subject to CC&Rs.55  The freedom to 
contract is a right that runs deep in the United States,56 and courts are 
extremely reluctant to intercede when private parties willingly enter 
into agreements with certain rights and restrictions.57  As owners accept 
the provisions included in their CC&Rs when they move into the 
community, some argue that they should be contractually barred from 
challenging them.58  These and other factors militate in favor of robust 
CC&Rs. 
On the other hand, there are compelling reasons to extend more 
free speech rights to common interest communities.  With the 
increasing prevalence of CICs,59 some scholars argue that there is little 
opportunity for prospective homeowners to actually seek out homes 
that are not burdened by association regulations.60  Moreover, many 
 
 54  Id.  Indeed, difficult behavior by residents is allegedly common practice in many 
CICs.  See Robert J. Galvin, Residential Condominiums—Drafting Management and 
Operational Provisions, CONDI MA-CLE 4-1 (2013) (“This sort of behavior will be 
familiar to those with experience in representing condominium associations.”). 
 55  See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 16, at 779–80 (citation omitted) (“At the root of 
the presumption of legitimacy accorded an association’s CC&Rs is consent.  Residents 
who complain about any provision of the association’s CC&Rs or bylaws must counter 
the argument that they read these restrictions, considered them, and signed anyway.  
In contrast to one’s membership in the broader society, it is asserted, one’s 
membership in an association may be regarded as ‘wholly voluntary.’”); Mazdabrook 
Commons Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Khan, 210 N.J. 482, 511–12 (2012) (Wefing, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that owners should be bound if they have “agreed freely” to live 
in a community with restrictions on free speech and ”there is no showing of 
overreaching or coercion”).  But see Kennedy, supra note 16, at 793 n.106 (discussing 
several problems with this position). 
 56  W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 406 (1937) (“[F]reedom of contract 
[is] the general rule and restraint the exception; and that the power to abridge that 
freedom [can] only be justified by the existence of exceptional circumstances.”). 
 57  See, e.g., Almers v. South Carolina Nat. Bank of Charleston, 265 S.C. 48, 60 
(1975); Taminco NV v. Gulf Power Co., 322 F. App’x 732, 734 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 58  See Mark Cantora, Increasing Freedom by Restricting Speech: Why the First Amendment 
Does Not and Should Not Apply in Common Interest Communities, 39 REAL EST. L.J. 409, 424 
(2011) (“[P]eople living in common interest communities voluntarily expand some 
set of preferred benefits by contracting some set of less-favored rights.  This happens 
every day outside of the CIC context in a democratic society, and is the very essence of 
democratic freedom.”); Grant J. Levine, This Is My Castle: On Balance, the Freedom of 
Contract Outweighs Classifying the Acts of Homeowners’ Associations As State Action, 36 NOVA 
L. REV. 555 (2012); Kennedy, supra note 55, at 779–80. 
 59  See supra note 7. 
 60  See Gott, supra note 16, at 220 (“[T]he growing proportion of properties 
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residents in CICs are arguably not given sufficient notice that their free 
speech rights will be severely restricted merely by moving into a certain 
community.61  And even for those who are aware of burdensome 
restrictions in their communities, most are nonetheless unable to 
bargain for different terms.62 
Additionally, HOA boards have been known to abuse their power, 
subjecting the residents of their communities to restrictions that seem 
intrinsically unreasonable.63  There are countless horror stories in this 
 
encumbered with covenants that provide for community association governance has 
made it increasingly difficult for a prospective home buyer to avoid.”); Franzese, supra 
note 2, at 755 (same); Askin, supra note 35, at 15 (discussing that in Twin Rivers, many 
people purchasing encumbered homes were merely looking for affordable housing, 
not the restrictions present in CC&Rs). 
 61  Of course, recordation of CC&Rs usually gives constructive notice to owners 
and binds them.  Paula A. Franzese, Building Community in Common Interest Communities: 
The Promise of the Restatement (Third) of Servitudes, 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 17, 38–39 
(2003).  There is good reason to believe, however, that residents do not actually read 
every sentence of the CC&Rs, and even if they do, that they do not understand the 
significance and breadth of every restriction.  See id.; see also supra note 8 and 
accompanying text.  Professor Winokur has suggested that: 
[m]ost prospective owners do not intelligently review the restrictions to 
which they subject themselves upon acceptance of a deed to land 
burdened by servitudes.  The documentation typically makes long, 
boring reading for laypersons, who rarely retain counsel to review the 
documentation involved in home purchases.  Even those who read the 
restrictions in advance may miscalculate their own future attitudes 
toward servitude restrictions, perhaps inaccurately expecting that 
friendly relations with neighbors will eliminate hostile disagreements 
between residents.  Such optimistic expectations are often disappointed. 
James L. Winokur, The Mixed Blessings of Promissory Servitudes: Toward Optimizing 
Economic Utility, Individual Liberty, and Personal Identity, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 1, 59 (1989). 
 62  Franzese, supra note 61, at 31 (citing Evan McKenzie, Reinventing Common Interest 
Developments: Reflections on a Policy Role for the Judiciary, 31 J. MARSHALL. L. REV. 397, 398 
(1998)) (“Typically, purchasers do not have the freedom or bargaining power to barter 
over terms contained in the declaration, described as ‘a 200-page adhesion contract, 
which is merely a stack of non-negotiable, standardized boilerplate provisions.’”). 
 63  See, e.g., Franzese & Siegel, supra note 2, at 761–65 (quoting Hannaman, supra 
note 8, at 2) (discussing the “undemocratic” conditions of CICs and severe abuses of 
power articulated in the Hannaman report, as well as other horror stories); Aldo 
Svaldi, Horror Stories Prompt Industry Group to Ask Colorado to Regulate HOA Managers, 
DENVER POST (Feb. 13, 2012, 1:00 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_19951732 
(presenting the story of an elderly couple on the verge of losing their home over fines 
that started with a misplaced trash can); Paul Bannister, Homeowner Horror Stories: 
Associations are Heaven or Hell, BANKRATE, http://www.bankrate.com/ finance/real-
estate/homeowner-horror-stories-associations-are-heaven-or-hell.aspx (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2015) (profiling numerous HOA horror stories, many which result in liens 
and/or foreclosure for the homeowner).  In fact, there is even an extensive comment 
feed on the popular social news site Reddit, where users post their own HOA horror 
stories.  See What are Your Home-Owners Association (HOA) Horror Stories?, REDDIT,  
http://www.reddit.com/r/AskReddit/comments/17v1fx/ 
what_are_your_homeowners_association_hoa_horror/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
PESCE (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2015  5:07 PM 
2015] COMMENT 889 
vein, ranging from an HOA’s decision to ban all recreation in common 
areas64 to an elderly woman who was fined every time she walked her 
dog through the lobby, even though she could not physically carry the 
dog as required by the CC&Rs.65  In fact, so many associations banned 
residents from flying the American flag outside of their homes that 
Congress actually passed a statute to protect this right.66  But even 
federal law has not stopped HOAs from engaging in this practice, even 
when the flag is so small that it fits in a flower pot.67 
In sum, although CC&Rs undoubtedly serve the legitimate 
purpose of ensuring comfortable uniformity within a community, 
many HOAs take this command too far.  By often enacting outright 
bans on virtually all kinds of free expression,68 HOAs are effectively 
attempting to turn CICs into “speech free” zones.  This intolerance is 
repugnant to the American tradition of vibrant discourse,69 especially 
 
 64  Anna Bakalis, Stonegate Villas Owners Say New Rules Unneighborly, VENTURA CNTY. 
STAR (July 12, 2008), http://www.vcstar.com/news/2008/jul/12/stonegate-villas-
owners-say-new-rules-i-feel-im/ (causing some residents to remark: “Sometimes it feels 
like jail here . . . .”). 
 65  Debora Vrana, The Runaway Power of Homeowners Associations, MSN REAL ESTATE 
(July 30, 2006), available at http://www.ccfj.net/HOArunawaypower.html. 
 66  The Freedom to Display the American Flag Act of 2005 reads:  
A condominium association, cooperative association, or residential real 
estate management association may not adopt or enforce any policy, or 
enter into any agreement, that would restrict or prevent a member of 
the association from displaying the flag of the United States on 
residential property within the association with respect to which such 
member has a separate ownership interest or a right to exclusive 
possession or use. 
Pub. L. No. 109–243, 120 Stat. 572 (2006).  There are also state analogs to this law.  See, 
e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 720.304 (2010) (guaranteeing the right of CIC residents to fly a 
flag “regardless of any covenants, restrictions, bylaws, rules, or requirements of the 
association”).  In reality, the fact that legislatures around the country, including 
Congress, have independently concluded that homeowners associations often pass 
overburdensome regulations is reason enough to conclude that more free speech 
rights should be extended to CICs. 
 67  Florida Man May Lose Home Over Display of American Flag, AOL (June 24, 2014, 
2:28 PM), http://www.aol.com/article/2014/06/24/florida-man-may-lose-home-
over-display-of-american-flag/20919158/ (describing a situation where a Florida 
veteran was fined $100 for every day that he kept a miniature American flag in his 
flower pot). 
 68  See, e.g., Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood Ave. Owners, Inc., 220 N.J. 71 (2014) (where 
the Board left a small bulletin board as the only means of expression within the 
community). 
 69  Setha M. Low, The Edge and the Center: Gated Communities and the Discourse of Urban 
Fear, AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 45 (2001) (“This retreat to secured enclaves with walls, 
gates, and guards materially and symbolically contradicts American ethos and values, 
threatens public access to open space, and creates yet another barrier to social 
interaction, building of social networks, as well as increased tolerance of diverse 
cultural/racial/social groups.”).  Indeed, the Supreme Court has always stressed the 
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when it is increasingly difficult for individuals to find residences that 
are unburdened by these types of restrictions.70  Therefore, it is vital 
for the preservation of free speech to identify methods to extend 
greater expressional rights to CICs. 
IV.  METHODS PROMULGATED TO EXTEND FREE SPEECH PROTECTIONS 
TO CICS 
Many different theories have been proposed to extend free 
speech rights to CICs.  The most popular of these suggestions have 
been to: (1) treat CICs as state actors, and thus subject them to 
constitutional obligations;71 (2) encourage legislatures to pass statutory 
protections for expressional rights in CICs;72 (3) push communities 
themselves to adopt CIC bills of rights to protect their own speech;73 or 
(4) persuade courts around the country to follow the New Jersey 
Supreme Court’s lead in finding that unreasonable restrictions are 
offensive to their state constitutions.74  While none of these theories 
has yet been widely adopted, each provides an opportunity to analyze 
and weigh the competing interests in an attempt to fashion the best 
possible solution. 
A. Treat CICs as State Actors, thus Subjecting Them to First 
Amendment Obligations 
Experts worry that those looking for new homes are increasingly 
unable to find properties without accompanying restrictions on free 
speech.75  Therefore, one of the most popular proposed solutions 
argues that CICs have become the de facto governmental entity in 
 
vital role of free speech and public discourse, remarking:  
The safeguarding of [free speech] rights to the ends that men may speak 
as they think on matters vital to them and that falsehoods may be 
exposed through the processes of education and discussion is essential 
to free government.  Those who won our independence had confidence 
in the power of free and fearless reasoning and communication of ideas 
to discover and spread political and economic truth. . . .  Abridgment of 
freedom of speech and of the press, however, impairs those 
opportunities for public education that are essential to effective exercise 
of the power of correcting error through the processes of popular 
government. 
Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940). 
 70  See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 71  See infra Part IV.A. 
 72  See infra Part IV.B. 
 73  See infra Part IV.C. 
 74  See infra Part IV.D. 
 75  See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
PESCE (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2015  5:07 PM 
2015] COMMENT 891 
substantial portions of the country, and should be treated as such.76  
Under this line of reasoning, if CICs fulfill many of the functions of 
municipalities, their actions should qualify as state action, opening 
them up to constitutional obligations.77 
There is no arguing with the fact that CICs provide services 
traditionally delivered by municipalities.  In fact, even the Community 
Association Institute, which represents the interests of community 
associations, describes the phenomena as such: 
Newly created community associations are increasingly 
required to provide their members with what have 
historically been considered “municipal” services.  
Association members must then typically pay the same local 
taxes as other neighboring homeowners even though trash 
collection, road and sidewalks maintenance and repair, 
street lighting, disposal of sewage, storm, flood and erosion 
control systems, shade and ornamental tree maintenance, 
security patrols for crime, disorder and public safety and 
other forms of public services are not made available to 
them.78 
Because these are traditional municipal services, some scholars argue 
that associations effectively operate as “quasi-governmental” entities, 
entitling residents to the same protections that are afforded to those 
living under normal government oversight.79  In practice, though, this 
 
 76  There is also a separate but related argument that extensive regulation and 
protection provided by state laws qualify associations as state actors.  Nevertheless, this 
idea has not caught on and is unlikely to succeed as a rationale for a state action 
designation on its own.  See, e.g., Yan Sui v. 2176 Pac. Homeowners Ass’n, SACV 11-
1340 JAK AJW, 2012 WL 6632758, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2012) (“[T]he fact that 
state law governs the formation and operation of the HOA does not make the HOA a 
state actor.”). 
 77  Although this argument is an extension of the Marsh principle, see supra notes 
32–38 and accompanying text, it has since taken on a life of its own. 
 78  2012 Public Policies of Community Associations Institute, Local Taxation and Public 
Services for Community Associations, supra note 3, at 54. 
 79  See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 16, at 763 (“Since the ability to wield such power 
is largely associated with the state, only by recognizing the quasi-governmental nature 
of these associations and their actions can the unique conflicts they engender be 
adequately addressed.”).  A particularly cogent recitation of this analysis is provided by 
Franzese and Siegel, who note: 
Presently, homeowners associations: (1) are assuming many functions 
and services traditionally provided by municipalities; (2) are often 
performing those functions and services with the use of taxpayer funds; 
(3) are often the product of conscious and deliberate municipal land-
use policy; (4) represent the standard template for new community 
development in many parts of this State; and (5) own networks of streets 
and open space that, if owned by a municipality, would have served as . . . 
traditional public forums for speech and assembly.  In the face of these 
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notion may be untenable, a sentiment that is borne out in the lack of 
support it has received by courts throughout the United States.80 
The initial resistance to this theory was that functions performed 
by associations do not supplant those essential services traditionally 
provided by municipalities,81 or that such claims were greatly 
exaggerated.82  Others argued forcefully that although associations 
perform some functions of government, such an attribute does not 
necessarily qualify them as governmental entities.83  Although these 
arguments are still discussed by commentators and courts,84 there 
seems to be a more fundamental disagreement with such a solution. 
The modern hesitation to implement this solution appears to be 
that it works too broad and monumental of a change to American 
jurisprudence by eviscerating the state action doctrine.85  A holding 
 
realities, it is simply untenable to continue a laissez-fare regime that 
presupposes that homeowners associations are wholly private 
organizations. 
Franzese & Siegel, supra note 2, at 765–66. 
 80  See, e.g., supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 81 & 83. 
 81  See, e.g., Midlake on Big Boulder Lake, Condo. Ass’n v. Cappuccio, 449 Pa. 
Super. 124, 128 (1996) (“While there is sewer service, private streets, and private 
maintenance, Midlake provides no facilities for community public use that are typically 
found in a municipality, such as schools, libraries, and other public functions.”); Brock 
v. Watergate Mobile Home Park Ass’n, Inc., 502 So. 2d 1380, 1382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1987) (“[T]he services provided by a homeowners association, unlike those provided 
in a company town, are merely a supplement to, rather than a replacement for, those 
provided by local government.”); Ross v. Hatfield, 640 F. Supp. 708, 711 (D. Kan. 1986) 
(finding that the community was not “sufficiently similar to the company-owned town 
in Marsh” because it did not have its own police or firemen, its own schools, 
independent trash collection, or public spaces serving the business needs of its 
residents, nor did the Board of Managers have the powers and rights of a town’s 
governing body). 
 82  Gott, supra note 16, at 207 (“Some [scholars] engage in a disingenuous inquiry 
into the services an association provides.”). 
 83  One court, citing Judge Richard Posner, used an analogy to explain why 
associations should not be considered government actors: 
There are two problems with this line of reasoning.  First, it ‘confuse[s] 
an entity and its attributes.’  Dogs breathe, eat, sleep, run, and play, but 
they are not humans, who also do all of those things.  And it is not as 
though the attributes [cited] are those which have been described by the 
Supreme Court as possibly exclusive state functions . . . .  Demonstrating 
that condominiums do certain things that state governments also do 
doesn’t show that condominiums are acting as the state or in the state’s 
place. 
Goldberg v. 400 E. Ohio Condo. Ass’n, 12 F. Supp. 2d 820, 823 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (citing 
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 211 (1995)). 
 84  See, e.g., Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners’ Ass’n, 383 
N.J. Super. 22, 43 (App. Div. 2006), rev’d, 192 N.J. 344 (2007). 
 85  The state action doctrine is a bastion of American jurisprudence.  Indeed, 
courts have said that “the fundamental nature of a constitution is to govern the 
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that any private entity which performs quasi-governmental functions 
could be held as a state actor would be unduly broad, likely capturing 
many community associations that may not function as quasi-
governments,86 as well as corporations,87 unions,88 and even sports 
leagues.89  Any test articulated to help determine what would vault an 
entity into “state actor” distinction would undoubtedly be imprecise, 
wholly subjective, and unpredictable.90  Such a test would do little to 
resolve the hodgepodge of seemingly contradictory judicial opinions 
on this issue around the country,91 nor adequately apprise boards and 
owners of their rights before litigation hashed them out. 
As the line between HOAs and local governments becomes even 
further blurred, especially as jurisdictions pass legislation mandating 
private associations for all new development,92 the calls for treating 
HOAs as state actors will only get stronger.93  But because the state 
 
relationship between the people and their government, not to control the rights of the 
people vis-a-vis each other.”  Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass’n, 
29 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001) (citation omitted).  By chipping away the state action 
doctrine, the interactions between private entities would effectively be controlled by 
the government, reducing choice and eroding the separation of powers.  For this 
reason, it is unlikely to ever be significantly curtailed.  See supra Part 0. 
 86  Ronald Perl, former president of the Community Associations Institute, 
inquired compellingly: “‘Does that apply to your brownstone condo in Hoboken?’ . . .  
‘Is your four-unit building a mini-municipality?’”  Laura Mansnerus, Chalk One Up for 
Homeowners, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/12/ 
nyregion/nyregionspecial2/12njHOME.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 87  Goldberg, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 823 (noting that “[t]he National Basketball 
Association makes rules, conducts hearings, issues decisions, and imposes fines, but it 
seems unlikely that the privately run sports league is a government actor,” and 
discussing how such reasoning could apply to unions and corporations as well). 
 88  Id. 
 89  Id. 
 90  For example, some have simply pegged it as a “fact-bound determination, 
requiring a variety of linkages between the actor and state authority.”  Kennedy, supra 
note 16, at 783.  Such a test would subject every significant private entity to lawsuits to 
determine whether they are to be treated as state actors under this framework. 
 91  Id. (“State courts have reached wildly different conclusions when faced with 
[this determination].”). 
 92  See Sharon Kolbet, Signs of the Times: How the Recent Texas Legislation Regarding 
Homeowners’ Associations Deprives Homeowners of Their Fundamental Free Speech Rights, 15 
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 85, 108 (2008) (citing Dallas, Tex., Development Code, 
Ordinance 22477 ch. 51, § 2(j) (1995)); Chadderdon, supra note 16, at 237. 
 93  Indeed, little by little, some courts have used language that seems to support 
such a position.  See, e.g., Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club, 85 Cal. App. 4th 468, 
479 (2000) (citations omitted) (“For many Californians, the homeowners association 
functions as a second municipal government . . . .”); Silk v. Feldman, 208 Cal. App. 4th 
547, 553 (2012) (citing Damon, 85 Cal. App. 4th at 475) (“Courts have recognized a 
homeowners association functions as a quasi-governmental entity, paralleling the 
powers and duties of a municipal government.”); Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. 
Twin Rivers Homeowners’ Ass’n, 383 N.J. Super. 22 (App. Div. 2006), rev’d, 192 N.J. 
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action impediment is such a large one, and because most states have 
already dug in their heels against such a proposition,94 this proposal is 
likely more of an academic exercise than a realistic solution. 
B. Legislative Extension of Free Speech Rights to CICs 
Some state legislatures have recognized the shortfalls of suggested 
judicial remedies to this problem, and have taken it upon themselves 
to protect free speech rights through legislation.95  California’s 
experience is instructive. 
Early on, the California judiciary led the way in extending 
constitutional protections to private settings, holding that free speech 
rights applied to private shopping centers.96  As time wore on, with 
heavy criticism of its rationales97 and a more conservative bench, the 
California Supreme Court sharply limited its extension of free speech 
rights,98 and appellate courts followed suit.99  With that, California’s 
 
344 (2007) (“The manner and extent to which functions undertaken by community 
associations have supplanted the role that only towns or villages once played in our 
polity mirrors the manner and extent to which regional shopping centers have become 
the functional equivalents of downtown business districts.”); Cohen v. Kite Hill Cmty. 
Assn., 142 Cal. App. 3d 642, 651 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (citation omitted) (citing a law 
review article which noted “the increasingly ‘quasi-governmental’ nature of the 
responsibilities of . . .  associations” and that “one clearly sees the association as a quasi-
government entity paralleling in almost every case the powers, duties, and 
responsibilities of a municipal government”).  It remains to be seen whether more 
courts will adopt this reasoning, but it is unlikely that a solution requiring such a 
substantial shift in this country’s jurisprudence will ever command considerable 
support. 
 94  See supra notes 47, 81, & 83 (surveying various courts that have rejected attempts 
to ascribe state action to private actors). 
 95  For example, Illinois has passed a statute, 765 ILCS 605/18.4(h), providing that:  
[N]o rule or regulation may impair any rights guaranteed by the First 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States or Section 4 of 
Article I of the Illinois Constitution including, but not limited to, the 
free exercise of religion, nor may any rules or regulations conflict with 
the provisions of this Act or the condominium instruments.  No rule or 
regulation shall prohibit any reasonable accommodation for religious 
practices, including the attachment of religiously mandated objects to 
the front-door area of a condominium unit.   
Many other states have passed legislation protecting free speech in CICs.  See, e.g., 
Suarez, supra note 16, at 759 n.116; Chadderdon, supra note 16, at 262–63 (discussing 
the legislative enactments of Arizona, Maryland, Florida, California, and Texas). 
 96  Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899 (1979); see supra note 44 
and accompanying text.  
 97  See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 98  See Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass’n, 29 P.3d 797 (Cal. 
2001) (holding that California’s free speech right does not apply to private apartment 
complexes). 
 99  Golinger, supra note 44, at 269 (noting that appellate courts further narrowed 
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judicial experiment came to a screeching halt.100 
Recognizing the importance of certain free speech rights within 
CICs, and aware that attempted judicial remedies were untenable, the 
California legislature was forced to act on its own.  In 2011, the 
legislature passed a statute specifically protecting free speech in CICs, 
with California Civil Code § 1940.4 guaranteeing the rights of residents 
to display political signs without ramifications from association 
boards.101  There are some reasonable limitations on this right, but the 
legislation nonetheless codifies rights for residents that the California 
Supreme Court was ultimately unable or unwilling to extend. 
California’s experience offers a model for other state legislatures 
to safeguard the rights of those living in CICs, without disturbing the 
state action doctrine.  Although some have suggested this as a viable 
solution,102 there are undeniable problems with such a course of action.  
For one, there are questions regarding the ability of legislatures to 
micromanage private entities and subvert the state action doctrine 
through legislation.  As “freedom of contract [is] the general rule and 
restraint the exception,”103 some have suggested that a retroactive 
 
the doctrine, holding that stand-alone stores like Target and Trader Joe’s were not 
subject to the same free speech restrictions). 
 100  The California Supreme Court now holds that “the actions of a private property 
owner constitute state action for purposes of California’s free speech clause only if the 
property is freely and openly accessible to the public.”  Golden Gateway Ctr., 29 P.3d at 
810; see also Cal. Prac. Guide Landlord-Tenant Ch. 4-D (2014). 
 101  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1940.4 reads:  
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (c), a landlord shall not prohibit a 
tenant from posting or displaying political signs relating to any of the 
following: 
(1) An election or legislative vote, including an election of a candidate 
to public office. 
(2) The initiative, referendum, or recall process. 
(3) Issues that are before a public commission, public board, or elected 
local body for a vote. 
(b) Political signs may be posted or displayed in the window or on the 
door of the premises leased by the tenant in a multifamily dwelling, or 
from the yard, window, door, balcony, or outside wall of the premises 
leased by a tenant of a single-family dwelling. 
(c) A landlord may prohibit a tenant from posting or displaying political 
signs in the following circumstances: 
(1) The political sign is more than six square feet in size. 
(2) The posting or displaying would violate a local, state, or federal law. 
 102  See, e.g., Suarez, supra note 16, at 762. 
 103  W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 406 (1937); see also In re Brooklyn 
Bridge Sw. Urban Renewal Project (Project No. N.Y. R-67) Manhattan, New York, 46 
Misc. 2d 558, 561 (Sup. Ct. 1965), aff’d, 24 A.D.2d 710 (1965) (citation omitted) 
(“While there is no absolute right of freedom of contract, the exercise of legislative 
authority to abridge it can be justified only where the enforcement of such a contract 
would conflict with dominant public interests.  Otherwise a statutory restraint on the 
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application of a statute that strips associations of previously held rights 
might be struck down via the Contracts Clause.104 
More fundamentally, the political will to pass legislation 
addressing each free speech issue may be lacking.  And even if there 
was the political will, passing legislation is often reactive, not proactive, 
and would provide an extremely slow solution to this problem.  
Moreover, state legislatures likely vary widely in how they view the role 
of government in controlling private entities, and inconsistent 
protections offered in different parts of the country would do little to 
help the current situation.  Therefore, although legislative enactments 
would do much to avoid the difficult state action question, it is unlikely 
that they would have the speed, uniformity, or predictability necessary 
to provide an adequate remedy. 
C. CIC Bill of Rights 
Similar to a reliance on legislative action to protect free speech in 
CICs, some scholars have suggested that residents themselves should 
take the initiative to protect free speech in their communities.105  A 
Residents’ Bill of Rights106 would ostensibly “provide meaningful 
oversight of homeowners associations without unduly restricting the 
power of governing boards to carry out their duties and obligations.”107  
This position is theoretically supported by advocates for community 
associations and boards, who argue that homeowners should shoulder 
the burden of setting aside the rights they wish to have in their 
communities.108  Homeowners control the boards, and are therefore 
 
freedom of the parties to contract is violative of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”). 
 104  See Ronald Perl and Brian Edlin, The Constitutional Conundrum; The Application 
of State and Federal Constitutions to Planned Communities and Condominiums, COLL. OF 
CMTY. ASS’N LAWYERS, §1.05 (Jan. 24–26, 2013). 
 105  See, e.g., Suarez, supra note 16, at 758. 
 106  For potential wording of such a Homeowner’s Bill of Rights, see French, supra 
note 8, at 351 (“Speech: The rights of residents to display political signs and symbols 
of the kinds normally displayed in or outside of residences located in single-family 
residential neighborhoods in their individually owned property shall not be abridged, 
except that the association may adopt reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions 
for the purpose of minimizing damage and disturbance to other owners and 
residents.”); see also Paul Boudreaux, Homes, Rights, and Private Communities, 20 U. FLA. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 479, 515–34 (2009). 
 107  Franzese & Siegel, supra note 2, at 768 (discussing legislative enactments that 
would function similarly to a homeowner’s “Bill of Rights”). 
 108  Chadderdon, supra note 16, at 260 (“HOA members do have the ability to 
change the covenants of the HOA through a vote of the members.  Thus, there appears 
to be a political remedy built into the HOA structure: if enough homeowners want to 
make a change, they can vote to make that change.”); see also infra Part 0 (suggesting 
that residents and boards should collaboratively change their CC&Rs to reflect 
reasonable allowances of free expression). 
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able to amend the associations’ governing documents as they 
collectively see fit. 
In reality, though, residents cannot be relied upon to protect free 
speech rights in their own communities.  As an initial matter, CC&Rs 
are almost always set before the sale of any homes, and usually exist for 
good reasons.109  In CICs, although select residents may be upset that 
their expression is limited, many more are thankful that there are 
restrictions to insulate the community from potentially disruptive 
speech.110  More fundamentally, even if the will exists,111 boards exercise 
significant control over the legislative process within associations and 
can greatly hinder any attempt to amend the CC&Rs to add such a bill 
of rights.112  As the desire to extend free speech methods in CICs will 
often be a minority position, it is unlikely that it will ever command the 
majority necessary to pass a Bill of Rights. 
 
 
 Therefore, while it may certainly help the situation for residents 
and boards to seek out internal solutions to free speech problems,113 a 
“Bill of Rights” cannot be relied on as the only, or even primary, 
method of safeguarding free speech rights in CICs. 
D. Applying a Constitutional Analysis: The New Jersey Approach 
The New Jersey Supreme Court has taken the matter into its own 
hands,114 devising a unique test under its state constitution that extends 
free speech rights without deeming CICs state actors.115  After the U.S. 
Supreme Court held in Pruneyard116 that states could find greater free 
 
 109  See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 110  See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text. 
 111  In addition to homeowners who actively support restrictions, apathy is also a 
major impediment to marshaling the will to amend the governing documents.  
Because many communities count non-votes as “no” votes, an indifferent owner is just 
as damaging as an owner who actually votes “no” on an amendment. 
 112  Chadderdon, supra note 16, at 260 (“[T]he notion that homeowners can makes 
changes to CC&Rs once becoming home-owning members of HOAs is largely 
illusory.”). 
 113  See infra Part 0 (arguing that while a more significant solution is necessary, 
boards and residents would do well to preemptively modernize their CC&Rs to protect 
reasonable amounts of free expression). 
 114  The only other court that has utilized the New Jersey approach was a Missouri 
state court in Lamprecht v. Tiara at the Abbey Homeowners Ass’n, 2013 No. 12-JE CC0027, 
WL 6144144 (Mo. Cir. Oct. 3, 2013).  See infra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 115  See generally Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood Ave. Owners, Inc., 220 N.J. 71, 73 (2014). 
 116  Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); see also supra note 
44. 
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speech protections under their own constitutions than the U.S. 
Constitution, and thus could extend free speech protections to certain 
kinds of private property,117 New Jersey was one of the first states to take 
that leap.118 
In its first post-Pruneyard foray into the issue of free speech in a 
traditionally private sphere, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
determined in State v. Schmid119 that there are certain instances where 
the public nature of private property begets some constitutional 
protections.120  The court recognized that “as private property 
becomes, on a sliding scale, committed either more or less to public 
use and enjoyment, there is . . . a counterbalancing between 
expressional and property rights.”121  In order to effectuate this 
understanding, the court developed a new test to determine the extent 




This standard must take into account (1) the nature, 
purposes, and primary use of such private property, 
generally, its ‘normal’ use, (2) the extent and nature of the 
public’s invitation to use that property, and (3) the purpose 
of the expressional activity undertaken upon such property 
in relation to both the private and public use of the property.  
This is a multi-faceted test which must be applied to ascertain 
whether in a given case owners of private property may be 
required to permit, subject to suitable restrictions, the 
reasonable exercise by individuals of the constitutional 
freedoms of speech and assembly.122 
Utilizing this test, the court held that Schmid was entitled to enter the 
campus of Princeton University and distribute political materials, 
despite a lack of permission from the University.123  This important 
holding opened the door slightly for those whose free speech was 
limited in other traditionally private spheres, and set the stage for New 
 
 117  In Pruneyard, the Supreme Court had held that California could extend free 
speech guarantees to private shopping centers under its own state Constitution.  447 
U.S. at 79–80. 
 118  See supra note 44.  
 119  84 N.J. 535 (1980). 
 120  Id. at 567. 
 121  Id. at 561 (citing Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946)). 
 122  Id. at 563. 
 123  Id. at 567–68 (“[I]n the absence of a reasonable regulatory scheme, Princeton 
University did in fact violate defendant’s State constitutional rights of expression in 
evicting him and securing his arrest . . . .”). 
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Jersey’s unique development of this constitutional framework. 
More than a decade later, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
extended the ruling of Schmid, holding in New Jersey Coalition Against 
War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corporation124 that regional private 
shopping malls had to permit leafleting on societal issues.125  In 
Coalition, the court added a new balancing test pitting expressional 
rights versus private property rights,126 which stood for the proposition 
that the more private property is utilized for public purposes, the more 
expressional rights may be enjoyed upon it.127  The court noted that 
the owners of the shopping mall had “intentionally transformed their 
property into a public square or market, a public gathering place, a 
downtown business district, a community,”128 which meant that “[t]he 
sliding scale [could not] slide any farther in the direction of public use 
and diminished private property interests.”129  On the private property 
interest side of the balancing test, the court observed that the plaintiff’s 
type of free speech was “substantial in [New Jersey’s] constitutional 
scheme”130 and that leafleting could be done without seriously 
infringing on the rights of other guests.131  After considering these 
interests, the court determined that the Schmid factors, as well as the 
general balancing, tilted in favor of allowing leafleting.132 
In its third major return to the question of free speech rights in 
private settings, the New Jersey Supreme Court reiterated in Committee 
for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners Association133 that a lack 
of state action is not an impediment to invoking free speech 
protections in the New Jersey constitution.134  For the first time, this 
 
 124  138 N.J. 326 (1994). 
 125  Cf. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal.3d 899 (1979) (expanding free 
speech protections to shopping malls in California). 
 126  Coalition, 138 N.J. at 362–63. 
 127  Id. at 363 (quoting Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946)) (“The more an 
owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the 
more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of 
those who use it.”). 
 128  Id. 
 129  Id. 
 130  Id. 
 131  Id. 
 132  Coalition, 138 N.J. at 365 (“We are totally satisfied that on balance plaintiff’s 
expressional rights prevail over defendants’ private property interests.  We are further 
satisfied that the interference by defendants with plaintiff’s rights constitutes 
unreasonably restrictive or oppressive conduct.”). 
 133  192 N.J. 344 (2007). 
 134  The court stated that “the rights of free speech and assembly under our 
constitution are not only secure from interference by governmental or public bodies, 
but under certain circumstances from the interference by the owner of private 
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precedent was applied to the actions of a private residential entity;135 
specifically, a policy restricting the size, number, and placement of 
signs within the community.136  Applying the Schmid/Coalition test, the 
court determined that the restrictions were not unreasonable and thus 
not unconstitutional, as they were merely time, place, and manner 
restrictions and residents had reasonable alternative opportunities to 
express themselves.137  Although the court ultimately found for the 
association138 and the opinion was somewhat “ambiguous and 
confusing,”139 the Twin Rivers decision nonetheless appeared to open 
the door even more for the eventual extension of free speech rights 
into CICs.140 
Just five years later, in Mazdabrook Commons Homeowners Assn. v. 
Khan,141 the New Jersey Supreme Court delivered a resounding victory 
for free speech in CICs, becoming the first state to strike down signage 
restrictions of a private CIC as violative of the state constitution.  The 
court again repeated that “[i]n New Jersey, an individual’s affirmative 
right to speak freely ‘is protected not only from abridgement by 
government, but also from unreasonably restrictive and oppressive 
conduct by private entities’ in certain situations.”142  Yet the court noted 
that the facts of Mazdabrook, where a resident posted a political sign 
endorsing his own candidacy and was fined pursuant to the 
association’s blanket sign restriction, required a different 
interpretation of the Schmid/Coalition test than the one conducted in 
 
property as well.”  Id. at 364.  The court also left no doubt about its departure from the 
state action doctrine, saying: “Simply stated, we have not followed the approach of 
other jurisdictions to require some state action before the free speech and assembly 
clauses under our constitution may be invoked.”  Id. 
 135  Franzese & Siegel, supra note 2, at 733. 
 136  Twin Rivers, 192 N.J. at 351 (The covenant held that “residents [could] post a 
sign in any window of their residence and outside in the flower beds so long as the sign 
was no more than three feet from the residence. . . .  The policy also forb[ade] the 
posting of signs on utility poles and natural features within the community.”). 
 137  Id. at 368. 
 138  Id. 
 139  Franzese & Siegel, supra note 2, at 743. 
 140  Franzese and Siegel stressed the subtle importance of the Twin Rivers decision: 
Although at first glance the Twin Rivers decision does not appear to 
constitute a bold proclamation of new doctrine, a more careful analysis 
of the Court’s opinion reveals that the Court did indeed announce the 
framework of a new constitutional approach to CICs.  That framework, 
although largely undefined in its details, provides a conceptual basis for 
a robust constitutional right of free speech and assembly applicable to 
CIC residents. 
Id. at 733. 
 141  Mazdabrook Commons Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Khan, 210 N.J. 482 (2012). 
 142  Id. at 493 (citations omitted). 
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Twin Rivers.143  Because the owner was not an outsider and actually 
owned the property on which the speech was expressed, a test that 
pitted expressional rights versus private property rights was an 
inadequate means to assess the tradeoff.144  Therefore, the court 
focused on the third Schmid factor and engaged in a more general 
balancing of Khan’s expressional rights versus the negative impact this 
speech had on the Association’s property and common areas.145  After 
observing that Khan held a legitimate right to free speech on his own 
residential property and that his speech had minimal interference with 
Association property,146 the court concluded that his rights outweighed 
the aesthetic interests of the Association, and that the outright ban on 




Despite Mazdabrook’s win for free speech, the test for evaluating 
free speech rights in CICs had become significantly muddled,148 and 
lower courts appeared unsure of how to apply the test to differing 
factual circumstances.149  Seeking to clarify this standard, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court recently decided Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood Ave. 
Owners, Inc.,150 in which it unanimously articulated a new test for 
analyzing restrictions on speech within CICs.  In Dublirer, a 
community’s “House Rule”151 banned solicitation and distribution of 
 
 143  Id. at 498–99. 
 144  Id.  The court explained that because Khan owned the property, “the first 
two Schmid factors [did] not favor near-absolute limits on placing a political sign inside 
[his] own home.”  Id. at 499. 
 145  Id. at 501. 
 146  Id. at 501–03. 
 147  Mazdabrook, 210 N.J. at 503. 
 148  Franzese & Siegel, supra note 2, at 747 (noting that the court had left 
“undefined the scope and application of this constitutional remedy,” and remarking 
that there could be “many years of appellate litigation before the precise contours of 
this remedy are fully delineated”). 
 149  See, e.g., Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood Ave. Owners, Inc., No. A-4800-08T3, 2011 WL 
3586139 (App. Div. 2011), aff’d, 220 N.J. 71 (2014) (where the Appellate Division 
purported to apply the Schmid test but failed to address how each prong of the test is 
to be assessed and valued, and neglected to discuss how the test changed based on the 
type of property and nature of the restriction). 
 150  220 N.J. 71 (2014). 
 151  Because the building in question was a private cooperative apartment building 
(often referred to as a “co-op”), which features residents who purchase shares of the 
building and hold leasehold interests in their units, the House Rule was enforced by a 
Board of Directors and not a Homeowners Association.  Although this difference may 
implicate different concerns, see Oral Argument, Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood Ave. 
Owners, Inc., 220 N.J. 71 (2014) (No. A-125-11), available 
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literature in common areas of the property without board approval.152  
A resident in the building ran for the Board of Directors and sought 
to distribute campaign literature on the premises, but the Board 
denied his request.153  The resident filed suit challenging the “House 
Rule,” the trial judge found for the Board, and the plaintiff appealed.154 
The Appellate Division applied the well-known Schmid three-
factor test, and found that although the community was private and 
there was no public invitation to the property,155 the restriction 
nonetheless failed the test because it was unreasonable.156  The court 
noted that the policy was especially unreasonable because it did not 
allow for any alternative means of expression157 and seemed to 
discriminate based on content.158  But because of the “ambiguous and 
confusing”159 nature of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s previous 
discussions of free speech in CICs, many issues remained unaddressed 
in the decision: (1) specific Supreme Court language appeared to 
contradict the Appellate Division’s holding;160 (2) it was unclear how a 
covenant could fail the Schmid test when two of the three factors 
militated in its favor;161 and (3) no court had addressed whether the 
 
at http://165.230.71.5/query.php?var=A-125-11 (where various questions were asked 
about the distinctions between different communities), the New Jersey Supreme Court 
has not officially weighed in on this issue. 
 152   The rule in question provided:  
There shall be no solicitation or distribution of any written materials 
anywhere upon the premises without authorization of the Board of 
Directors.  Without prior consent of the Board of Directors, no sign or 
notice shall be placed upon the bulletin board, [in] the mail room, in 
the halls, lobby, elevators or on the doorways.  A bulletin board for 
residents[’] use is provided [near] the rear door. 
Dublirer, 220 N.J. at 251–52. 
 153  Id. at 252. 
 154  Dublirer, 2011 WL 3586139, at *1. 
 155  Id. at *4. 
 156  Id. at *6. 
 157  Id. at *5. 
 158  Id. at *6.  It is important to note here that the Board of Directors did not evenly-
apply the rule.  For one, there was evidence that that Board itself engaged in the exact 
type of speech it prohibited the residents to engage in, namely in distributing 
newsletters that attacked the Board’s critics.  Id. at *2.  In addition, the Board 
permitted local police and firefighters to solicit donations by knocking on doors.  Id.  
These facts tend to indicate that the Board discriminated based on content, and 
although the Appellate Division did not explicitly hold this, it undoubtedly influenced 
the perception of the reasonableness of the rule.  Id. at *6; Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood 
Ave. Owners, Inc., 220 N.J. 71, 88–89 (2014). 
 159  Franzese & Siegel, supra note 2, at 743. 
 160  See infra note 167. 
 161  The Appellate Division neglected to discuss the nature of the interaction 
between the different prongs of the Schmid test.  Do all prongs need to be satisfied for 
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analysis changed based on the identity of the speaker and type of 
community.162 
Recognizing these deficiencies, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
issued somewhat of a mea culpa in Dublirer, admitting that 
the Schmid/Coalition test [is] not a perfect fit for private 
residential communities.  The first prong of the Schmid test, 
for example, is largely subsumed by the issue itself.  In the 
case of restrictions imposed by the board of a private 
common-interest community of dwellings, the primary 
nature and use of the property, by definition, is private.  The 
second prong—the extent of the public’s invitation to use 
the property—is even less relevant because residents do not 
need an invitation to use property in their own community.163 
Thus, in an attempt to “clarify the standard,”164 the court declared that 
the Schmid test should no longer be applied when the speaker is an 
owner, not a visitor.165  In those situations, “courts should [instead] 
focus on ‘the purpose of the expressional activity undertaken’ in 
relation to the property’s use . . . and should also consider the ‘general 
balancing of expressional rights and private property rights.’”166  Thus, 
in its clearest decision since Schmid, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
finally stated what the test really was all along: a balancing test between 
free expression and property rights.167  Applying this new test to the 
 
a defendant to prevail?  Must all prongs be satisfied for a plaintiff to win?  The court 
decided that the first two prongs weighed in favor of the association, but found that 
the third factor, which weighed in favor of the resident, trumped the first two and 
necessitated a finding for the plaintiff.  Dublirer, 2011 WL 3586139, at *4–5. 
 162  See supra note 151. 
 163  Dublirer, 220 N.J. at 84–85. 
 164  Id. at 85.  See also Frank Askin, N.J. Supreme Court Decision Clarifies Rules for Condo 
Associations, Other Properties, THE STAR-LEDGER (Dec. 11, 2014), 
http://www.nj.com/opinion/index.ssf/2014/12/nj_supreme_court_decision_clarifi
es_rules_for_condo_associations_other_properties_opinion.html (suggesting that 
“the Court took the occasion to clarify the law and end the confusion caused by the 
Twin Rivers opinion”). 
 165  Dublirer, 220 N.J. at 84–85. 
 166  Id. at 85 (quoting State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 563 (1980); N.J. Coal. Against 
War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 138 N.J. 326, 362 (1994)). 
 167  Although it shored up some of the problems with the previous test, Dublirer 
arguably raised as many questions as it answered.  For one, express New Jersey 
Supreme Court language seems to directly contradict the holding in this case.  In two 
different decisions, the New Jersey Supreme Court has explicitly said: 
The list of ‘horribles’ suggested by defendants as the inevitable 
consequence of our holding for other forms of private property should 
be dealt with now, rather than in some future litigation.  No highway 
strip mall, no football stadium, no theater, no single huge suburban 
store, no stand-alone use, and no small to medium shopping center 
sufficiently satisfies the standard of Schmid to warrant the constitutional 
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facts, the court held that the “House Rule” was unconstitutional 
because Dublirer’s important interest in promoting his candidacy and 
communicating his views about community to governance 
“outweigh[ed] the minor interference that neighbors w[ould] face 
from a leaflet under their door.”168 
With this line of cases, New Jersey is unquestionably at the 
forefront of adopting a more flexible approach to extending free 
speech rights to CICs.169  And this constitutional framework is likely a 
better solution than any of the aforementioned theories, such as 
treating CICs as state actors,170 relying on legislative action,171 or 
pushing residents to protect their own interests.172  It is reasonable, 
faster than legislative action, and more reliable than depending on 
residents to fix the problem themselves.  Yet the ongoing saga from 
Schmid to Dublirer underscores the difficulty other states will likely 
encounter if they choose to adopt New Jersey’s approach to free 
 
extension of free speech to those premises, and we so hold. 
Coalition, 138 N.J. at 373; Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners’ 
Ass’n, 192 N.J. 344, 361 (2007).  The court never addressed this language in Dublirer.  
Second, it is still unclear whether slight factual differences fundamentally change the 
constitutional inquiry.  For example, what if the building is a small, two-family building 
as opposed to a large condominium complex?  Is there a difference between an HOA 
and a co-op?  How does the inquiry change for requests by residents to express 
themselves through community newsletters or community websites?  Is there less 
protection when the speech involved is political, as opposed to “political-like” in 
Dublirer?  Third, the court has suggested that knowing and intelligent waiver might not 
be possible for free speech rights in the CIC context, Mazdabrook Commons 
Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Khan, 210 N.J. 482, 505–06 (2012), but it has not further 
explained this proposition, and it is still unclear whether waiver no longer applies.  
These and many more questions abound, and will seemingly require the court to 
return to this issue very soon. 
 168  Dublirer, 220 N.J. at 89. 
 169  As it stands, only one other court has followed the reasoning of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court and extended state constitutional protections to private CICs.  The 
first and only extra-state extension of New Jersey’s constitutional approach was by a 
Missouri state court in Lamprecht v. Tiara at the Abbey Homeowners Ass’n, 2013 No. 12-JE 
CC0027, WL 6144144 (Mo. Cir. Oct. 3, 2013), which involved facts “nearly identical” 
to Mazdabrook.  Id. at *3.  In Tiara at the Abbey, a covenant mandated that “no sign of 
any kind shall be displayed to the public view” but made exceptions for “for sale” signs 
and signs placed by the builder or remodeler to advertise the property.  Id. at *1.  In 
its analysis of the constitutionality of the covenant, the court engaged in an almost 
identical analysis as the New Jersey Supreme Court, complete with a discussion of the 
expansiveness of the Missouri state constitution, the fundamental importance of 
political speech, an analysis of the Schmid factors, and the Coalition balancing test.  Id. 
at *2–4.  Based on these considerations, the court determined, similarly to Mazdabrook, 
that a restriction on political signage is an unreasonable restriction and 
unconstitutional under Article I, § 8 of Missouri’s constitution.  Id. 
 170  See supra Part IV.A. 
 171  See supra Part IV.B. 
 172  See supra Part IV.C. 
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speech in CICs.  Therefore, as discussed in more detail in Part B, 
although the New Jersey test is noble for the results it commands, its 
complexity and unpredictability make it difficult to apply even in New 
Jersey, much less the rest of the country. 
V.  STRIKING COVENANTS AS UNREASONABLE AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY: 
WHY THE RESTATEMENT TEST PROVIDES THE MOST WORKABLE 
SOLUTION 
This Comment argues that the position taken by the Restatement 
(Third) of Property (“Restatement”) is the most viable method of 
extending free speech to CICs.  The Restatement suggests that courts 
should find a servitude “invalid if it is illegal, unconstitutional, or 
violates public policy.”173  In this way, by allowing courts to strike free 
speech restrictions that contravene public policy, the Restatement 
provides a contract and property-based means of ensuring that 
residents in CICs are given reasonable freedom of expression.  This 
attempts to shift the discussion from somewhat distracting 
constitutional arguments to more substantive and thoughtful ones like 
“whether the arrangement poses such risks to the social good that 
judicial modification or nullification is warranted.”174 
And since judicial non-enforcement of covenants as unreasonable 
against public policy is a “long-standing axiom of contract law,”175 the 
Restatement’s suggestion is not so much a novel suggestion as it is the 
modern application of a time-tested approach.  In this way, the 
Restatement test provides a method of guaranteeing free expression in 
CICs that is simple, reliable, and replicable around the country. 
A. Overview of the Restatement Test 
The Restatement test closely resembles the test the New Jersey 
Supreme Court recently articulated in Dublirer,176 in that it requires a 
balancing between the benefit derived from a covenant versus the 
harm of leaving the restriction in place.177  The Restatement begins by 
commanding that a servitude: 
is valid unless it is illegal or unconstitutional or violates 
public policy.  Servitudes that are invalid because they violate 
public policy include, but are not limited to: 
(1) a servitude that is arbitrary, spiteful, or capricious; 
 
 173  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES ch. 3, intro. note (2000). 
 174  Id. 
 175  In re Village Homes of Colorado, Inc., 405 B.R. 479, 483 (2009). 
 176  Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood Ave. Owners, Inc., 220 N.J. 71, 84 (2014). 
 177  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. e (2000). 
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(2) a servitude that unreasonably burdens a fundamental 
constitutional right; 
(3) a servitude imposes an unreasonable restraint on 
alienation under § 3.4 or § 3.5; 
(4) a servitude that imposes an unreasonable restraint on 
trade or competition under § 3.6; and 
(5) a servitude that is unconscionable under § 3.7.178 
If the servitude does not fall clearly into one of these prohibitions, the 
Restatement requires courts to weigh the “interests in enforcing the 
servitude” against the “public interests that would be adversely affected 
by leaving the servitude in force.”179 
 
 
As to the first element, which considers the interests served by the 
servitude, the Restatement test begins with the presumption that all 
covenants are valid.180  This presumption recognizes that “policies 
favoring freedom of contract, freedom to dispose of one’s property, 
and protection of legitimate-expectation interests nearly always weigh 
in favor of the validity of voluntarily created servitudes.”181  To 
accommodate this assumption, the Restatement shifts the burden to 
the party claiming that a servitude should be struck down as a violation 
of public policy,182 and places strong reliance on waiver, though 
without mentioning it by name.183  Courts may also look to the 
community benefits derived from the restriction, such as attempts to 
be free from offensive speech, freedom from litter, and freedom of 
privacy.184 
As to the second half of the balancing test, courts must then 
consider what societal interests would be adversely affected if the 
servitude were left in place.185  This hinges on what constitutes “public 
 
 178  Id. at § 3.1. 
 179  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES ch. 3, intro. note (2000). 
 180  Id. at § 3.1 cmt. i. 
 181  Id.  
 182  Id. 
 183  Id. (“If the principal costs of a servitude fall on the parties who have accepted 
the burdened property in circumstances in which they should have understood the 
costs, courts should be reluctant to invalidate the servitude, no matter how costly it 
turns out to be to one of the parties . . . .”). 
 184  See generally Brief for Community Associations Institute – New Jersey Chapter as 
Putative Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 20–25, Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood 
Ave. Owners, Inc., 220 N.J. 71 (2014) (No. A-125-11) (discussing, among other things, 
some of the bargained-for benefits of covenants restricting leafleting). 
 185  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. i (2000). 
PESCE (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2015  5:07 PM 
2015] COMMENT 907 
policy,” a definition courts have grappled with for decades.186  The 
general concept of public policy in the servitudes context is that: 
An agreement is against public policy if it is injurious to the 
interest of the public, contravenes some established interest 
of society, violates some public statute, is against good 
morals, tends to interfere with the public welfare or safety, 
or, as it is sometimes put, if it is at war with the interests of 
society and is in conflict with public morals.187 
At first glance, this seems an impossible task; such an undefined 
standard would be wholly subjective, unpredictable, and unfair.188  But 
the Restatement addresses this issue head-on; it readily acknowledges 
that the concept of public policy is “somewhat amorphous”189 and 
undertakes to simplify this judicial method through a set of standards 
to evaluate public policy.190 
 
 186  William Story remarked more than a century ago that 
[p]ublic policy is in its nature so uncertain and fluctuating, varying with 
the habits and fashions of the day, with the growth of commerce and the 
usages of trade, that it is difficult to determine its limits with any degree 
of exactness.  It has never been defined by the courts, but has been left 
loose and free of definition, in the same manner as fraud.  This rule may, 
however, be safely laid down, that wherever any contract conflicts with 
the morals of the time, and contravenes any established interest of 
society, it is void, as being against public policy. 
WILLIAM W. STORY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 675 (1874); see also 
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 403–404 (1960) (noting that 
“[p]ublic policy is a term not easily defined” because “[i]ts significance varies as the 
habits and needs of a people may vary”). 
 187  Odatalla v. Odatalla, 355 N.J. Super. 305, 314 (Ch. Div. 2002) (quoting 
Garlinger v. Garlinger, 129 N.J. Super. 37, 40 (Ch. Div. 1974)). 
 188  Cf. supra Part D (criticizing the New Jersey approach as being similarly 
undefined and unpredictable). 
 189  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES ch. 3, intro. note (2000). 
 190  Id. at § 3.1 cmt. i.  This entire portion of the comment reads: 
Resolving claims that a servitude violates public policy requires assessing 
the impact of the servitude, identifying the public interests that would 
be adversely affected by leaving the servitude in force, and weighing the 
predictable harm against the interests in enforcing the servitude.  Only 
if the risks of social harm outweigh the benefits of enforcing the 
servitude is the servitude likely to be held invalid.  The policies favoring 
freedom of contract, freedom to dispose of one’s property, and 
protection of legitimate expectation interests nearly always weigh in 
favor of the validity of voluntarily created servitudes.  A host of other 
policies, too numerous to catalog, may be adversely impacted by 
servitudes.  Policies favoring privacy and liberty in choice of lifestyle, 
freedom of religion, freedom of speech and expression, access to the 
legal system, discouraging bad faith and unfair dealing, encouraging 
free competition, and socially productive uses of land have been 
implicated by servitudes.  Other policies that become involved may 
include those protecting family relationships from coercive attempts to 
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The Restatement offers that sources of public policy can be “the 
product of judicial development, or they may be based on legislation, 
or on the provisions of state or federal constitutions.”191  In considering 
the public policy interests espoused by state constitutions and 
legislative actions, the Restatement test is effectively a consolidation of 
multiple proposed solutions.192  For example, even if the state 
constitution could not be applied to private actions due to the state 
action doctrine, it could nonetheless provide a basis for judges to strike 
down restrictions as violative of public policy.193  And even if legislatures 
are not able to proactively protect every method of free expression 
through legislation, its existing pronouncements could be used by 
judges in considering whether the legislature would prefer to protect 
the type of expression in question.194  As a result, courts may look to 
these and other sources to determine whether striking down the 
covenant in question implicates interests such as “privacy and liberty 
in choice of lifestyle, freedom of religion, [and] freedom of speech 
and expression.”195  If the court finds that these interests outweigh the 
benefits of enforcing the servitude, then the court may void the 
servitude as offensive to public policy.196 
But the Restatement does not stop there.  In order to give courts 
further guidance, the Restatement also puts forth various illustrations 
to describe types of covenants that would not survive the public policy 
 
disrupt them, and protecting weaker groups in society from servitudes 
that exclude them from opportunities enjoyed by more fortunate groups 
to acquire desirable property for housing or access to necessary services. 
 191  Id. at § 3.1 cmt. f; see also Allen v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 131 N.J.L. 475, 477–
78 (N.J. 1944) (suggesting that “[t]he sources determinative of public policy are, 
among others, our federal and state constitutions, our public statutes, our judicial 
decisions, the applicable principles of the common law, the acknowledged prevailing 
concepts of the federal and state governments relating to and affecting the safety, 
health, morals, and general welfare of the people for whom government — with us — 
is factually established”). 
 192  See supra Part B (discussing the suggestion that legislatures should take the lead 
on extending free speech rights); Part D (discussing New Jersey’s approach of using 
the state constitution’s expansive First Amendment to strike down restrictions on 
speech). 
 193  See, e.g., Kolbet, supra note 92, at 107 (“In Texas, because the state Constitution 
provides broad free speech protection, a Texas court could rightly hold that a total 
ban on political signs violated public policy, and was therefore unenforceable.”). 
 194  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. f (2000) (“Courts may 
apply the policies manifested by legislation more broadly than the legislation provides, 
but they may not refuse to apply policies manifested by legislation in situations to 
which it clearly applies.”). 
 195  Id. § 3.1 cmt. i. 
 196  Id.  
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analysis.197  These include covenants that unreasonably restrict criticism 
of the community association,198 the posting of political signs,199 display 
of an American flag,200 and door-to-door solicitation of signatures by an 
outside citizens group.201  These illustrations give courts a useful 
framework for conducting the public policy balancing test and help to 
ensure that the test is conducted consistently by any court that applies 
it. 
As with the other proposed theories, there are of course 
imperfections with the Restatement approach.  As an initial matter, 
courts are extremely reluctant to interfere in the contractual relations 
of two private parties in the name of public policy.202  This is bolstered 
by the fact that servitudes are now considered extremely valuable 
aspects of property.203  Thus, declaring them void as against public 
policy might decrease the expected value of residents’ properties. 
In addition, how are courts to weigh competing public policy 
considerations, when each is compelling?  Certainly, as stated 
poignantly by the Texas Supreme Court, one very important public 
 
 197  Id. at § 3.1 Illustrations. 
 198  Id. § 3.1 illus. 5. 
 199  Id. § 3.1 illus. 7 (noting that “the harm to the public interest in citizen 
participation in political debate outweighs the value of validating the servitude” 
because “reasonable alternative means of exercising the right are not available”). 
 200  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 illus. 8 (2000) (explaining that 
flag restrictions would be void because “[d]isplay of the flag has strong expressive 
value, ready alternatives are not available, and the adverse impacts on other 
subdivision lot owners are not likely to be substantial”).  But see id. at illus. 9 (explaining 
that a size restriction on a displayed American flag is not voidable because smaller flags 
provide adequate means of expression and large or numerous flags may hurt 
aesthetics). 
 201  Id. at illus. 18 (explaining that if a covenant denied access to anyone not a 
resident or his invitee, the “burden on the exercise of political speech rights of the 
Citizens group [would] outweigh[] the benefit to the residents of freedom from 
intrusion”). 
 202  See, e.g., Lawrence v. CDB Servs., Inc., 44 S.W.3d 544, 553 (Tex. 2001), superseded 
on other grounds by statute, Tex. Lab. Code § 406.033(e) (“Courts must exercise judicial 
restraint in deciding whether to hold arm’s-length contracts void on public policy 
grounds.”); RSN Properties, Inc. v. Eng’g Consulting Servs., Ltd., 301 Ga. App. 52, 53 
(2009) (quoting Emory Univ. v. Porubiansky, 248 Ga. 391, 393 (1981)) (“[T]he courts 
must exercise extreme caution in declaring a contract void as against public policy and 
should do so only in cases free from doubt.”). 
 203  Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1369, 1416–17 (2013) (“The modern approach recognizes that servitudes are not 
merely encumbrances on property that should be narrowly construed but that they are 
valuable property rights in themselves, precisely because of the stability they provide 
to the owners of dominant estates.  That is why most courts have repudiated the 
traditional notion that ambiguous covenants should be interpreted narrowly in favor 
of free use of land, adopting instead the modern idea that they should be interpreted 
to achieve the intent of the grantor.”); see also supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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policy is the right to contract itself: 
[I]f there is one thing which more than another public policy 
requires it is that men of full age and competent 
understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, 
and that their contracts when entered into freely and 
voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by 
Courts of justice.  Therefore, you have this paramount public 
policy to consider—that you are not lightly to interfere with 
this freedom of contract.204 
This quote illustrates the undeniable tension throughout the country 
between public free speech interests and the freedom to contract.205  As 
a result, despite the Restatement’s attempts to normalize its prescribed 
analysis, there is still sufficient wiggle room in the balancing test that 
might only further perpetuate the inconsistencies currently found in 
CICs throughout the country. 
These imperfections raise the question: Why is the Restatement’s 
balancing test any better than, say, New Jersey’s balancing test?206 
B. Why the Restatement Test is the Best Method of Extending 
Reasonable Free Speech Rights to CICs 
Although the Restatement’s prescribed test is by no means 
perfect, it nonetheless provides the best method of expanding free 
speech rights to CICs. 
First, the Restatement provides a non-constitutional method of 
striking down unreasonable restrictions on speech, which should 
always be considered before a constitutional method of adjudication.207  
In general, courts are hesitant to “reach a constitutional question 
unless its resolution is imperative to the disposition of litigation.”208  
This theme of constitutional avoidance was articulated years ago by 
 
 204  Fairfield Ins. Co. v. Stephens Martin Paving, LP, 246 S.W.3d 653, 664 (Tex. 
2008) (quoting Wood Motor Co., Inc. v. Nebel, 150 Tex. 86, 93 (1951)). 
 205  See Baugh v. Novak, 340 S.W.3d 372, 382 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting Steven W. 
Feldman, Tennessee Practice: Contract Law and Practice § 7:3, at 732 (2006) (“The need 
for delicacy arises because exercising the authority ‘to declare contracts as void as 
against public policy is in tension with freedom of contract and the need to bind 
parties to their voluntary agreements.’”)). 
 206  See generally Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood Ave. Owners, Inc., 220 N.J. 71 (2014). 
 207  See generally Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) 
(“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented 
by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be 
disposed of. . . .  Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving 
a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, 
the Court will decide only the latter.”). 
 208  Mazdabrook Commons Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Khan, 210 N.J. 482, 504 n.4 
(2012) (quoting Randolph Town Ctr., L.P. v. Cnty. of Morris, 186 N.J. 78, 80 (2006)). 
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Frank Askin, one of the foremost advocates for the extension of free 
speech rights in the country: 
Because state courts always retain the common law power to 
strike down regulations they find unreasonable and against 
public policy, it is seldom necessary to fall back on 
constitutional principles when deciding disputes between 
the association and a member.  Any rule that a court might 
find to be unconstitutional will probably be invalidated on 
common law principles—although it is true that several cases 
in Florida have referred to constitutional protections for free 
speech and family privacy to invalidate rules found to be 
unnecessarily restrictive of individual autonomy.  However, 
the references to constitutional principles were unnecessary 
because those courts could have come to the exact same 
conclusions on common law grounds.209 
Since this caution by Askin, New Jersey and other courts have 
nonetheless engaged in confusing, inconsistent, and unpredictable 
constitutional analyses.210  Because voiding servitudes as violative of 
public policy is a separate and independent means of reaching the 
same result,211 courts should never even reach the constitutional 
analysis. 
Second, the constitutional analysis is far more complicated than 
 
 209  Frank Askin, Free Speech, Private Space, and the Constitution, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 947, 
955–56 (1998). 
 210  Interestingly enough, Frank Askin recently argued for the ACLU in the Dublirer 
case, where he asked the New Jersey Supreme Court to strike down a restriction on 
leafleting as unconstitutional.  He does not appear to have made any mention of non-
constitutional methods of adjudication. 
 211  For example, the Restatement’s Illustration 5 poses almost the exact same 
factual situation as Dublirer.  It reads: 
The declaration of servitudes for Harmony Village includes a provision 
prohibiting owners and residents from criticizing actions taken by the 
board of directors or the architectural-control committee except at 
regularly scheduled meetings of the board.  A resident unhappy about a 
board decision to construct a new tennis court distributed a flyer to 
residents criticizing the board decision.  Exercising its power to enforce 
the servitudes by fines, the board imposed a $1,000 fine on the resident.  
In the absence of other facts or circumstances, the conclusion would be 
justified that the prohibition on criticism of board actions is invalid 
because it unreasonably burdens freedom of speech. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 illus. 5 (2000); cf. Dublirer v. 2000 
Linwood Ave. Owners, Inc., 220 N.J. 71 (2014) (where a co-op Board of Directors 
selectively enforced a prohibition on leafleting, such that criticized its opponents in a 
regular newsletter but prohibited its opponents from doing the same).  Thus, in a 
jurisdiction that utilized the Restatement, the five-year litigation of Dublirer would likely 
have been completely unnecessary, either because the Board would have had 
constructive notice (through the Illustrations) that such a practice would be improper, 
or because this would have been an open-and-shut case in the trial court. 
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the Restatement’s property-based test.212  For example, in Mazdabrook, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court devoted over ten pages of legal analysis 
to the constitutional issues presented by a sign restriction, despite 
tackling an extremely similar case only five years earlier.213  The court 
also briefly engaged in the type of property-based analysis that the 
Restatement suggests,214 but came to the same conclusion in only two 
paragraphs.215  Therefore, not only does it appear that the court was 
not forced to engage the constitutional question at all, but it also seems 
that the court chose the more difficult method. 
Third, the property-based analysis is replicable throughout the 
United States.  Unlike New Jersey, which stands alone in bypassing the 
state action doctrine and applying its state constitution to private 
communities,216 most states are simply unable to follow that line of 
reasoning without undoing decades of case law217 and ignoring the 
 
 212  See supra text accompanying note 139. 
 213  Mazdabrook, 210 N.J. at 492–503.  As if that was not enough complex, 
constitutional legal analysis on the issue, the court again returned to the issue just two 
years later.  See Dublirer, 220 N.J. 71. 
 214  Mazdabrook, 210 N.J. at 507 (holding that “[t]o the extent that Mazdabrook or 
the dissent relies on a restrictive covenants analysis, the Association’s sign policy 
likewise fails”). 
 215  The court further stated: 
‘[R]estrictive covenants on real property that violate public policy are 
void as unenforceable.’  Twin Rivers, 192 N.J. at 370 (citations omitted).  
When courts evaluate whether a covenant burdening land is 
enforceable, they must determine whether the covenant is reasonable.  
See Davidson Bros., Inc. v. D. Katz & Sons, Inc., 121 N.J. 196, (1990).  
Among other factors that inform that decision is ‘[w]hether the 
covenant interferes with the public interest.’  Id. at 211. 
This Court explained in Twin Rivers that ‘restrictive covenants that 
unreasonably restrict speech—a right most substantial in our 
constitutional scheme—may be declared unenforceable as a matter of 
public policy.’  Twin Rivers, 192 N.J. at 371.  Because the restriction in 
question is unreasonable and violates the State’s Constitution, the 
covenant that memorializes it is unenforceable. 
Mazdabrook, 210 N.J. at 507 (parallel citations omitted).  The court never stated why 
this simple property-based analysis was not sufficient to decide the case. 
 216  New Jersey’s constitutional guarantee of free expression has been described as 
“an affirmative right, broader than practically all others in the nation.”  Green Party v. 
Hartz Mountain Indus., Inc., 164 N.J. 127, 145 (2000).  This alone makes it highly 
unlikely that other states can replicate the New Jersey’s constitutional test. 
 217  See, e.g., supra note 47 and accompanying text.  Indeed, even states with almost 
identical free speech language in their constitutions as New Jersey’s have declined to 
ignore the state action requirement.  For example, Michigan’s constitution is nearly 
the same as New Jersey’s, but its courts have nonetheless held that “the federal and the 
Michigan constitutional provisions guaranteeing free speech do not extend to private 
conduct, but have been limited to protection against state action.”  Prysak v. R.L. Polk 
Co., 193 Mich. App. 1, 10 (1992). 
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fundamental doctrine of stare decisis.218  To the contrary, every state 
would be able to adopt the Restatement’s approach.219  The practice of 
voiding contracts as against public policy is a long-standing mainstay of 
jurisprudence220 and is well-established in courts around the country.221  
Thus, the Restatement shifts the discussion to which rights society 
believes should be protected, as opposed to complex constitutional 
discussions over how to extend any rights to otherwise private entities. 
Fourth, the Restatement test is more predictable than a 
constitutional approach.  Through its “Illustrations,” the Restatement 
promulgates several types of expression that would not survive such a 
public policy analysis.222  If each of these free speech rights is 
automatically protected in every state, a valuable uniformity of baseline 
free expression rights would be created in the United States.  
Moreover, because the Restatement’s illustrations are proactive 
pronouncements, as opposed to limited constitutional court rulings 
that focus only on the case at hand,223 boards and residents would not 
be forced to guess what speech is permitted and could often act before 
courts were forced to intermediate.224 
 
 218  The Supreme Court has clearly articulated the importance of an adherence to 
stare decisis.  See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).  Although the Supreme 
Court has also said that the reviewing court is not as constrained by the doctrine “when 
governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned,” id.at 828, the Court also 
notes that “[c]onsiderations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving 
property and contract rights, where reliance interests are involved,” id. (citations 
omitted).  Therefore, states with a strong history of disallowing free speech in private 
environments may find it difficult to overcome the reliance on stare decisis with such a 
new and unique constitutional test.  
 219  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. d (2000) (“Even though 
there may not be sufficient state action present to justify application of constitutional 
limitations to privately created servitudes, the servitude may be invalid as a matter of 
state or federal common law because it violates public policy.”). 
 220  See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
 221  See supra Part V.A. 
 222  See supra notes 198–201 (suggesting that associations could not prohibit 
criticism of the community association, the posting of political signs, display of the 
American flag, and door-to-door solicitation of signatures by an outside citizens 
group). 
 223  See, e.g., Franzese & Siegel, supra note 2, at 747 (“Suffice it to say that it may well 
require many years of appellate litigation before the precise contours of this remedy 
are fully delineated.”); supra note 211 (arguing that if New Jersey had simply adopted 
the Restatement test instead of making piecemeal pronouncements on the 
constitutionality of certain free speech restrictions in CICs, the Dublirer case would 
never have had to be litigated). 
 224  In essence, because the New Jersey test does not give much in the way of 
guidance for future issues, as opposed to the Restatement, it leaves residents and boards 
with mere speculation as to the contours of free speech protections.  See also Part 0 
(suggesting that in the interim, Boards and residents should use the Restatement 
illustrations as guidelines to adopt their own reasonable free speech policies before 
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Yet at the same time, the property-based doctrine is necessarily 
flexible.225  In a country with different types of CICs in varying 
environments, it is beneficial to give courts the opportunity to make 
calculations for their own communities.226  The Restatement ensures 
that judicial determinations are not made on the most fundamental of 
expressional rights,227 but allows individual communities to determine 
themselves where to draw the outer membrane of free speech rights in 
CICs.228  These less fundamental free expression rights are likely more 
local in character, and the Restatement gives courts the flexibility to 
fashion their remedies as such. 
Fifth, the Restatement test actually considers the important 
countervailing issues at stake on both sides of the issue.  Although 
recent years have seen HOAs exceed reason with overburdensome free 
speech restrictions,229 there are undoubtedly good reasons why CC&Rs 
are adopted in the first place.230  By beginning with the presumption 
that all covenants are valid,231 the Restatement does not make aesthetics 
the sacrificial lamb for unbridled free speech rights.232  And in 
 
they are challenged in court).   
 225  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt i (2000); id. at § 3.1 
cmt. f (“Because policies change to meet changing conditions of society, it is not 
practicable to predict the policy assessments judges will make in the future.”); STORY, 
supra note 186 (describing that the concept of public policy “has been left loose and 
free of definition” because it is, by nature, “uncertain and fluctuating”). 
 226  For example, a CIC in rural Arkansas is likely to be different in structure and 
interests than one from New York City, so it would be improper to subject them to the 
same exact requirements.  Since the public policies in each location will be different, 
local communities can decide themselves what is reasonable.  Of course, this could 
result in harsher treatment of minority positions (like mezuzahs in Arkansas or college 
football flags in New York City); but the most important rights are likely protected by 
the Restatement’s illustrations, and as discussed below, the ability of the U.S. Supreme 
Court to intercede might provide an additional safeguard. 
 227  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 Illustrations (2000) 
(providing examples to inform the courts on what types of restrictive covenants should 
be struck down as violating public policy, effectively guaranteeing that those rights 
would be protected around the country and leaving only the less essential expressional 
rights to be determined by the courts). 
 228  See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 403 (1960) (“Public 
policy is a term not easily defined.  Its significance varies as the habits and needs of a 
people may vary.  It is not static and the field of application is an ever increasing one.  
A contract, or a particular provision therein, valid in one era may be wholly opposed 
to the public policy of another.”). 
 229  See supra notes 63–66. 
 230  See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 231  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. i (2000). 
 232  Id. at § 3.1 cmt. j (“Absent extraordinary circumstances, if a servitude serves 
some purpose that the purchasers might rationally have agreed to, and its meaning 
should have been apparent to the purchasers, a court should not invalidate it simply 
because the court believes that most people would not have agreed to it, or that it 
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recognizing that a knowing and intelligent waiver may factor into the 
analysis,233 the Restatement does not swing the pendulum towards 
residents quite as far as the New Jersey Supreme Court has.234  In this 
way, the Restatement test is presumably a much more palatable 
method for advocates of private contract rights and the maintenance 
of uniformity and aesthetics in CICs.235 
For those state courts potentially willing to consider the extension 
of free speech rights into CICs, it seems clear that the Restatement 
provides a method of adjudication that is relatively simple, replicable 
around the country, and does not eviscerate the state action doctrine.  
Therefore, in looking for ways to extend free speech rights to CICs, 
courts should first turn to the prescriptions of the Restatement and a 
property-based analysis, as opposed to the constitutional one advanced 
by the New Jersey Supreme Court. 
VI.  WHAT CAN BE DONE IN THE INTERIM?: PROACTIVE ACTION BY HOA 
BOARDS TO AMEND THEIR GOVERNING DOCUMENTS 
The major difficulty with the Restatement’s prescribed test is that 
it is non-binding–a mere recommendation of what the law should be.236  
Although Restatements have always been well-respected sources of 
 
produces little benefit.”). 
 233  Id. at § 3.1 cmt. i. 
 234  Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court has insinuated that residents may never 
waive their rights in a CIC.  See Mazdabrook Commons Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Khan, 
210 N.J. 482, 506 (2012) (“It is unclear that the approach in this case can result in a 
knowing and intelligent waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.”).  Yet the dissents 
in the Appellate Division and Supreme Court in Mazdabrook starkly disagreed with the 
inapplicability of waiver.  See Mazdabrook Commons Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Khan, A-
6106-08T3, 2010 WL 3517030 (App. Div. 2010) (Miniman, J, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part), aff’d, 210 N.J. 482 (2012) (“The restriction on signs and the right 
to sue to enforce it are included in the bundle of rights, restrictions, encumbrances, 
and easements contained in the deed to defendant’s unit.  Thus, defendant and all 
other unit owners expressly agreed that they would not violate the prohibition on signs 
and each owner was empowered to enforce that restriction.”); Mazdabrook, 210 N.J. at 
511 (Wefing, J., dissenting) (“[I]ndividuals are equally entitled to seek shelter from 
political debate and division.”). 
 235  See Christopher J. Wahl, Keeping Heller Out of the Home: Homeowners Associations 
and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1003, 1012–13 (2013) (“While 
[the Restatement test’s] imprecision may lead one to fear that a court may have too 
much leeway, the fact that servitudes are protected with a presumption of validity works 
against the potential bias or prejudice of a court applying the flexible public policy test 
to a servitude.”). 
 236  See, e.g., Lou v. Otis Elevator Co., 77 Mass. App. Ct. 571, 580–81 (2010) (citing 
Bongaards v. Millen, 440 Mass. 10, 29 (2003)) (noting that “while this court often 
considers the various Restatements of the Law as prestigious sources of potentially 
persuasive authority, we have never taken the position that this court should abdicate 
to the views of the American Law Institute as set forth in its various Restatements”). 
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legal authority,237 courts around the country will have to buy into the 
Restatement’s reasoning and apply its test faithfully.  While this 
Comment argues that courts around the country should adopt the 
Restatement test and extend reasonable free speech rights to residents 
of CICs, it is unlikely that this will happen overnight.  In the meantime, 
it would behoove both HOAs and residents to proactively amend the 
governing documents of their communities to reflect a reasonable 
allowance of free expression within CICs.  Although boards are often 
hesitant to extend more rights to residents, and residents feel 
powerless to make changes themselves, working together to offer 
reasonable free speech rights in CICs makes sense for several reasons. 
First, the tide is changing.  HOAs may resist the extension of free 
speech into CICs, but the eventual protection of basic expressional 
rights in these communities is likely inevitable.238  Given the force of 
the Third Restatement,239 powerful and revolutionary court 
decisions,240 and compelling scholarly suggestions,241 it is only a matter 
of time before free speech protections are imposed on CICs.  In order 
to have a hand in fashioning the remedies themselves, boards must act 
before they are forced by courts, legislatures, and/or residents.242 
Second, in some states, boards are putting themselves in difficult 
situations by refusing to, or merely neglecting to, amend their 
 
 237  See id.; Secondary Sources: ALRs, Encyclopedias, Law Reviews, Restatements, and 
Treatises, HARV. L. SCH. LIBR., http://guides.library.harvard.edu/content.php? 
pid=103327&sid=1036651 (last visited May 20, 2015) (“Restatements are highly 
regarded distillations of common law.”). 
 238  See, e.g., Askin, supra note 209, at 956 (suggesting that “[it] is inevitable in a 
society as deeply committed to freedom of expression and communication as ours that 
more and more courts are going to” follow New Jersey’s lead in extending free speech 
rights to CICs).  In fact, even New Jersey’s complex constitutional analysis was recently 
adopted elsewhere in the country.  See supra note 169 (describing Lamprecht v. Tiara at 
the Abbey Homeowners Ass’n, No. 12 JE-CC00227, 2013 WL 6144144 (Mo. Cir. Oct. 3, 
2013), where a Missouri state court appeared to adopt the New Jersey test in full). 
 239  See supra Part 0. 
 240  See supra Part D. 
 241  See supra note 16; Part 0. 
 242  For example, following the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Dublirer, a 
law firm that represents community associations released a client alert that stated 
bluntly: “[The decision] provides a clear message to common interest ownership 
community governing boards that they must allow adequate means for community 
residents to be able to inexpensively communicate with each other and with the board 
and should not try to prevent debate over association political issues or criticism of the 
board.”  Jonathan H. Katz, Client Alert: N.J. Supreme Court Issues Important Decision 
Expanding Community Association Residents’ Free Speech Rights, CONDOLAWNJ (Dec. 8, 
2014, 1:11 AM), http://www.condo.hillwallackblog.com/ client-alert-n-j-supreme-
court-issues-important-decision-expanding-community-association-residents-free-
speech-rights/. 
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governing documents.  For one, associations that maintain 
unreasonable blanket restrictions on certain types of free expression 
may then find it difficult to police any types of expression, even 
offensive ones.243  And from a practical standpoint, HOAs that choose 
not to amend their documents also run the risk of incurring substantial 
litigation costs when their CC&Rs are eventually challenged.  The 
extension of free speech rights into private entities, and increasingly 
CICs, is a fast-growing area of litigation, and there is no sign of it 
abating.244  To insulate themselves from the specter of costly litigation, 
HOAs would be wise to be proactive and adopt reasonable guidelines 
for speech within their communities. 
Therefore, boards and residents should preemptively adopt 
reasonable free speech protections in their governing documents.  
Guidance should be drawn from the Restatement’s “Illustrations,”245 
suggestions from the New Jersey Supreme Court,246 and federal247 and 
local248 legislative actions.  But there are several other animating 
principles that boards and residents should consider when amending 
and applying their CC&Rs.  First, associations should ensure that if a 
method of free expression is entirely or mostly prohibited, there are 
reasonable alternative means of expression available to residents.249  In 
addition, boards should be sure to avoid uneven application of rules; 
engaging in the same type of expression that residents are prohibited 
from may raise an inference that the board is unreasonably 
 
 243  In other words, boards may find it difficult to enforce any restrictions on speech 
if they adopt only blanket restrictions, and not reasonable time, place, and manner 
restrictions.  For example, if a resident in CIC puts neon signs saying “Obama sucks” 
in each one of his windows, what recourse does an HOA have if their entire sign 
restriction is declared invalid, but they have adopted no other time, place, and manner 
restrictions to prevent this seemingly distasteful display? 
 244  See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 245  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. SERVITUDES § 3.1 Illustrations (2000). 
 246  See, e.g., Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood Ave. Owners, Inc., 220 N.J. 71, 87–88 (2014) 
(providing some examples of “reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions” that 
would “serve the community’s interest” but “without unreasonably interfering with 
free speech rights”). 
 247  See, e.g., supra note 66 (describing, among other things, a law passed by Congress 
prohibiting bans on flying American flags). 
 248  Many states have passed legislation seeking to protect certain kinds of political 
speech.  HOAs should ensure that their CC&Rs reflect these local legislative 
pronouncements.  See infra Part B; see also, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 202.009 
(prohibiting associations from banning political signs within 90 days preceding and 10 
days following the election). 
 249  See, e.g., Comm. For A Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners’ Ass’n, 
192 N.J. 344, 358–59 (2007) (quoting State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 563 (1980)) (noting 
the importance of “whether there exist convenient and feasible alternative means to 
individuals to engage in substantially the same expressional activity”). 
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discriminating based on content.250  And finally, boards should be 
particularly careful when attempting to regulate political speech.251 
With the Restatement as a guide, boards’ involvement in 
fashioning reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions would 
create a beneficial two-way street, where boards and homeowners 
could reach a compromise.  Only then can this contentious system252 
become a collaborative one, where boards and homeowners work 
together to safeguard the best interests of the community and its 
residents. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
We live in a country that embraces diversity and celebrates it, yet 
too often, CICs seek to create homogenous zones free from various 
modes of expression.253  Although time, place, and manner restrictions 
are unquestionably necessary to avoid offensive forms of speech, more 
stringent restrictions are antithetical to the embracing aspect of 
community life in the United States.254 
In order to scale back these confining servitudes, there must be 
widespread implementation of the options above, but especially court 
adoption of the Restatement position.  Only then will we be able to 
effect the profound change we want to see in CICs.  Then, finally, we 
will ensure the protection of one of the most important interests in our 
CICs, which sits at the base of American democracy: the freedom of 
expression. 
 
 250  See, e.g., Dublirer, 220 N.J. at 88 (citation omitted) (“Nothing in our case law 
permits a group in power to attack its opponents yet bar them from responding in the 
same way.  ‘As a general rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from 
disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content-based.’”). 
 251  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. SERVITUDES § 3.1 illus. 7 (2000) (suggesting 
that “application of [a] covenant to prohibit political yard signs is invalid because the 
harm to the public interest in citizen participation in political debate outweighs the 
value of validating the servitude”); Dublirer, 220 N.J. at 71 (suggesting that political 
speech is “entitled to the highest level of protection in our society”). 
 252  See supra notes 53–54 & 63–65 and accompanying text. 
 253  See generally supra Part 0.   
 254  See Low, supra note 69 (expressing that our “retreat to secured enclaves . . . 
materially and symbolically contradicts American ethos and values”); Kennedy, supra 
note 16, at 763 (“Residential associations cause harms to nonmembers by developing 
exclusive communities, by gating formerly public streets and neighborhoods, and by 
increasing the fiscal burdens of cities and states.”). 
